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REBUILDING PLATFORM ANTITRUST:
MOVING ON FROM OHIO V. AMERICAN EXPRESS
Steven C. Salop, Daniel Francis, Lauren Sillman, & Michaela Spero *
Abstract. Now that the immediate fallout from the Supreme Court’s blockbuster Amex
decision has cooled, this Article aims to give a first draft of its place in antitrust history
and to offer a roadmap for the next stage of the evolution of platform antitrust analysis.
We focus on several issues that have not been fully analyzed in the literature. First, we
argue that, rather than mangling the law of market definition, the Court should have
explicitly permitted multi-market balancing of effects across the separate markets in which
the platform was active. Second, we propose standards to implement such balancing in
cases involving multisided platforms in a principled manner, and we illustrate those
standards by application to the facts of Amex itself. Third, we highlight three significant
omissions in the Court’s analysis that confounded its assessment of the case and threaten
to mislead future courts. In particular, we show that the Court failed to take into account
that: (1) all three major card networks had parallel anti-steering rules during the period of
alleged anticompetitive conduct and harm, which increased the anticompetitive harms by
(a) increasing the incentives for fee increases for each network, (b) reducing the incentives
for fee decreases by each network, and (c) leading the Amex restraints to harm holders of
other credit cards as well as consumers who pay with debit, cash and checks; (2) higher
merchant fees caused by these parallel antisteering rules placed consumers into a
prisoners’ dilemma game, which led inevitably to increased use of credit cards above the
efficient, competitive level, making the volume of card transactions a poor proxy for
welfare effects; and; (3) American Express’ cardholder rewards were not necessarily
evidence of procompetitive consumer benefits, as some rewards may have represented
rents from anticompetitive conduct. Finally, we suggest several options for the courts and
Congress to remedy the problems caused by the Court’s faulty approach and place
platform antitrust back on track.

INTRODUCTION
On June 25, 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court issued what may be the worst
antitrust decision in many decades: Ohio v. American Express Co.
(“Amex”).1 In an opinion authored by Justice Thomas for a bare majority—
and over an incredulous dissent—the Court dismissed an antitrust challenge
*

Professor of Economics & Law, Georgetown University Law Center (Salop); Assistant Professor of
Law, NYU School of Law (Francis); Staff Attorney, Federal Trade Commission (Sillman) (written in
her personal capacity and not as a representative of the FTC; the views expressed are her own and not
necessarily those of the Commission or any individual Commissioner); Legal Counsel Regulatory
Affairs, Amadeus (Spero). For immensely helpful and generous comments, we are grateful to Erik
Hovenkamp, Herbert Hovenkamp, Al Klevorick, Douglas Melamed, John Newman, Sharis Pozen,
John Robertson, and Irving Scher, as well as Tammy Feldman, Tina Miller, and three anonymous peer
reviewers for the Antitrust Law Journal.
1
138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018). Candidates for the previous record-holder could include, in no particular
order, Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933); United States v. U.S. Steel Corp.,
251 U.S. 417 (1920); United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967); and United States
v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
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to American Express’s “antisteering” rules, despite ample evidence of harm
furnished by a lengthy trial, as well as the teachings of economic theory. In
doing so, the Court upended a series of legal fundamentals, inverted
accepted practices in the interpretation of evidence, and plunged platform
antitrust into confusion.2
The Court’s tortured analysis has left courts, agencies, and businesses with
a host of puzzles; triggered a flurry of scholarship and commentary, mostly
very critical;3 and invited a flurry of ill-conceived litigation arguments. 4 The
practical inheritance of Amex is plain to see: the burdens faced by plaintiffs
have been needlessly increased, and enforcement efforts have been
obstructed.5 At least one high-profile merger challenge has already failed as
a direct result of Amex’s legacy of confusion,6 and the decision will
continue to haunt and obscure the antitrust analysis of “Big Tech” platform
practices for years to come.
Much has been written about Amex. Commentators have criticized the
opinion in a variety of respects, including its treatment of market definition
and its handling of effects evidence.7 Some commentators have also
criticized the Court’s introduction of a formal market-definition
requirement for vertical cases, and its refusal to accept direct evidence of
anticompetitive effects as proof of market power. 8 Others have critically
2

Note that the Court used the terms “two-sided market” and “platform” interchangeably. To avoid
confusion with the antitrust concept of a relevant product market, in this article, we use the term
“platform” to refer to multisided business models and the term “market” when discussing antitrust
market definition. See generally infra Section II.B.2.
3
See, e.g., Michael Katz & Jonathan Sallet, Multisided Platforms and Antitrust Enforcement, 127 YALE
L.J. 2142, 2154 (2018); Dennis W. Carlton, The Anticompetitive Effects of Vertical Most-FavoredNation Restraints and the Error of Amex, 2019 COLUMBIA BUS. L. REV. 93 (2019); Herbert
Hovenkamp, Platforms and the Rule of Reason: The American Express Case, 2019 COLUMBIA BUS. L.
REV. 35 (2019); Erik Hovenkamp, Platform Antitrust, 44 J. Corp. L. 713 (2019); Michael L. Katz & A.
Douglas Melamed, Competition Law as Common Law: American Express and the Evolution of
Antitrust, 168 U. PENN. L. REV. 2061 (2020); Natasha Sarin, What’s in Your Wallet (and What Should
the Law Do About It?), U. Chi. L. Rev. 553 (2020). See also, e.g., Joshua D. Wright & John M. Yun,
Ohio v. American Express: Implications for Non-Transaction Multisided Platforms, Competition Pol’y
Intl. Antitrust Chronicle (June 2019) (endorsing Amex).
4
See, e.g., United States v. Sabre Corp., 452 F. Supp. 3d 97 (D. Del. 2020); Defendant’s Supplemental
Briefing on United States v. Am. Express, United States v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth., No.
3:16-cv-00311-RJC-DCK (W.D.N.C. Oct. 12, 2016).
5
See US Airways, Inc. v. Sabre Holdings Corp, 938 F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 2019).
6
The reasoning of the district court in United States v. Sabre Corp. was strongly influenced by the
Amex decision, as discussed infra.
7
See, e.g., Erik Hovenkamp, Platform Antitrust, 44 J. Corp. L. 713 (2019); Michael L. Katz & A.
Douglas Melamed, Competition Law as Common Law: American Express and the Evolution of
Antitrust, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 2061 (2020); John B. Kirkwood, Antitrust and Two-Sided Platforms: The
Failure of American Express, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 1805 (2020).
8
See e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Platforms and the Rule of Reason: The American Express Case, 2019
COLUMBIA BUS. L. REV. 35 (2019).

April 2022]

REBUILDING PLATFORM ANTITRUST

3

analyzed the Court’s use of economic theory and evidence, including with
respect to the impact of the antisteering rules on competition,9 as well as the
Court’s reliance on the fact of market growth as evidence that the restraints
were procompetitive.10 And, while the balance of scholarly commentary has
been negative, some have defended the Court’s decision and reasoning, 11
while others have favored the decision but not the reasoning. 12
This Article looks to the future. Our aim is to provide a general framework
for courts and agencies to use in confronting practices and transactions in
future platform cases. We draw on litigation evidence and economic theory
to explain why the approach and reasoning of the Amex decision was
objectionable, and to offer a better method for future platform antitrust
matters. In particular, we build on the idea that appears to have motivated
the Court in Amex—that certain platform cases may compel a special
approach grounded in the distinctive economics of multisided businesses—
and develop an alternative for courts and agencies to the flawed and
incomplete analysis that permeates the opinion. We propose a set of
principles to guide balancing in platform cases to replace the Court’s
misguided approach, and we demonstrate the utility of those principles by
applying them to the Amex trial record, including some underappreciated
aspects of that record. We also offer some practical suggestions for courts
and legislators to help put Amex behind us and right the ship of platform
antitrust.
We proceed in four Parts. Part I sets out the evidentiary record (including
critical facts ignored or marginalized by the Court), as well as the holdings
of the Amex courts upon that record. Part II crystallizes the Amex’s Court’s
analytical errors—both legal and economic—and outlines a better approach
to platform antitrust cases: one that accurately reflects economic realities in
platform cases while preserving antitrust’s legal fundamentals. Part III
demonstrates the utility of our proposed approach by applying it to Amex
itself. Finally, Part IV briefly outlines three routes back to a sensible
platform antitrust framework: a clean course-correction by the Supreme
Court; limiting decisions by lower courts that would take seriously the

9

See e.g., Dennis W. Carlton & Ralph A. Winter, Vertical MFN’s and the Credit Card No-Surcharge
Rule, 61 J.L. & ECON. 215 (2018).
10
See e.g., John Newman, The Output-Welfare Fallacy: A Modern Antitrust Paradox, 107 Iowa L.
Rev. 563 (2022).
11
See e.g., Joshua D. Wright & John M. Yun, Ohio v. American Express: Implications for NonTransaction Multisided Platforms, Competition Pol’y Intl. Antitrust Chronicle (June 2019) (proposing
the retention and extension of Amex).
12
See e.g., Aaron M. Panner, Market Definitions and Anticompetitive Effects In Ohio v. American
Express, 130 YALE L.J. FORUM 608 (2021).
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many limiting conditions that were expressed and implied in the Amex
majority opinion; and a surgical fix by Congress.
I. AN ANTITRUST TALE OF WOE
A. The Origin of Antisteering
Credit card networks, which emerged in their modern form in the mid-20 th
century,13 are platforms. Visa and Mastercard operate as networks
connecting financial institutions that offer Visa- or Mastercard-branded
credit cards to cardholders (through “issuing banks”) with financial
institutions that offer payment acceptance services to merchants (known as
“acquiring banks”).14 By contrast, American Express interacts directly with
both cardholders and merchants.15
When a cardholder uses a credit card, the merchant pays a fee. For Visa and
Mastercard payments, this merchant fee is allocated among three parties:
the cardholder’s issuing bank; the merchant’s acquiring bank; and the credit
card network itself.16 For American Express payments, the merchant fee is
generally retained in full by American Express. 17 American Express’s
revenue stream depends primarily on this fee; those of Visa and Mastercard
depend primarily on offering credit services to their cardholders, for which
they charge an interest rate.18
As credit card use grew after the 1960s, American Express, Visa, and
Mastercard competed with one another for both merchants and
cardholders.19 By 1990, Amex accounted for 25% of the dollars processed
by all the credit card networks.20 In response to American Express’s
expansion, Visa and Mastercard launched a series of marketing campaigns
seeking to encourage cardholders to use their own cards instead,
highlighting American Express’s smaller network of merchants and its
higher merchant fees.21 These campaigns were effective: for example, the
District Court found that a “We Prefer Visa” campaign contributed to a 25–

13

United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d. 143, 160 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
Id. at 157.15 Id.16 Id. at 157.
15
Id.16 Id. at 157.
16
Id. at 157.
17
Id.
18
Id. at 159.
19
Id. at 161.
20
Id.
21
Id.
14
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45% shift in card volume from American Express to Visa. 22 By 1995,
American Express’s share of dollars processed had dropped to 20%. 23
American Express responded by introducing contractual restraints
preventing merchants from steering customers to lower cost cards like Visa
or Mastercard.24 These “antisteering” rules, which American Express refers
to as “Non-Discrimination Provisions,” prohibit merchants from
“attempting to influence their customers’ card choices” through any of a
variety of monetary and non-monetary means. 25 Rather than attempt to
tempt merchants away with fee reductions, Visa and Mastercard instead
followed suit, tightening their own antisteering rules. 26 And with merchants
now prohibited from steering away from American Express, Mastercard, or
Visa, the three networks all implemented merchant fee increases.27
Discover tried offering lower merchant fees and, in 1999, led a marketing
campaign to encourage merchants to steer customers to use their Discover
card.28 But merchants informed Discover that their hands were tied because
of antisteering provisions in their contracts with the other networks. 29 Thus,
Discover’s discount-based challenge was effectively repelled. 30
A decade later, in 2010, the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) filed a
complaint in the Eastern District of New York challenging Visa,
Mastercard, and American Express’s antisteering rules, alleging that all
three credit card networks violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act by
requiring merchants to agree to these provisions.31 Visa and Mastercard
settled with DOJ in 2011 and agreed to abandon their antisteering rules for a
period of ten years.32 But American Express refused to follow suit.33 At the
time, American Express was the largest single card issuer in the United

22

Id.
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id. at 165.
26
Id.
27
Id. at 201–02.
28
Brief for Discover Financial Services as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 7, Ohio v, Am.
Express Co. (Dec. 14, 2017) (No. 16-1454) (hereinafter “Discover Brief Amicus Curiae”).
29
Id. at 8.
30
Id. at 8–9.
31
Final Judgment as to Defendants MasterCard International Incorporated and Visa Inc., United States
v. Am. Express Co., No. CV-10-4496 (NGG) (RER) (E.D.N.Y. July 20, 2011), ECF No. 143
(hereinafter “Visa-MasterCard Settlement”).
32
Visa-MasterCard Settlement.
33
Competitive Impact Statement at 14, United States v. Am. Express Co., No. CV-10-4496 (NGG)
(RER) (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2010).
23
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States, and American Express-branded cards accounted for a significant
share of credit card transaction volume.34
B. District Court
In 2015, following a seven-week bench trial, the District Court held that
American Express’s antisteering rules violated Section 1 of the Sherman
Act.35 The court reasoned that the antisteering rules constitute non-price
vertical restraints and as such should be adjudged under the rule of reason. 36
The court applied a fairly traditional rule-of-reason framework. In step one,
the plaintiff bears the burden of “demonstrating that the challenged
restraints have had an adverse effect on competition as a whole in the
relevant market.” The plaintiff may do so directly, by “show[ing] an actual
adverse effect on competition caused by the restraint in the relevant market,
such as increased prices or a reduction in output,” or indirectly, by
“establishing that [the defendant] had sufficient market power to cause an
adverse effect on competition” and that “there are other grounds to believe
that the defendant’s behavior will harm competition market-wide.” 37 In step
two, the burden shifts to the defendant to offer “evidence of the procompetitive effects of their agreement.”38 Finally, in step three, the burden
shifts back to the plaintiff to “prove that any legitimate competitive benefits
proffered by Defendants could have been achieved through less restrictive
means.”39
At step one, the court held that the plaintiffs had established harm to
competition through both direct and indirect evidence. In its analysis of the
indirect evidence, the court followed an earlier Second Circuit decision 40 in
holding that American Express’s platform operated in at least “two separate,
yet deeply interrelated, markets”: (1) a card issuance market, in which
American Express and its competitors supplies services to cardholders, and
(2) a network services market, in which American Express and its

34

United States v. Visa USA, Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 237 (2d Cir. 2003). Visa-branded cards (issued by
multiple banks) accounted for a larger share of all transactions. Amex was still the largest issuer at the
time of the Supreme Court decision in Amex, but as of 2020 has fallen behind Chase. Top Issuers of
General Purpose Credit Cards in the U.S., NILSON REPORT no. 1192 (Feb. 2021).
35
88 F. Supp. 3d. at 143.
36
Id. at 169.
37
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
38
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
39
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). Note that, unlike many other formulations of the rule
of reason, the District Court did not also mention that, at this stage of the rule of reason, plaintiffs may
also show that, on balance, the harms resulting from the restraints outweigh the procompetitive effects
put forward by the defendant. See Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
40
Visa, 344 F.3d at 234.
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competitors supply acceptance services to merchants.41 Despite the separate
nature of these two markets, the court cautioned that its analysis would
“account for the two-sided features of the credit card industry in its market
definition inquiry, as well as elsewhere in its antitrust analysis.” 42
Examining these markets, the court concluded that American Express held
market power in the market for network services provided to merchants, in
which it enjoyed a share of 26.4%.43 It chronicled evidence of
concentration, high barriers to entry, and inelastic demand for use of
American Express cards.44 The court concluded that the indirect evidence
alone was sufficient to discharge the plaintiffs’ burden. 45
The court also evaluated the plaintiffs’ direct-effects case thoroughly,
focusing on the tendency of the antisteering rul es to “suppress its network
competitors’ incentive to offer lower prices … and resulting in higher
profit-maximizing prices across the network services market. 46 The court
noted that, between 2005 and 2010, American Express had implemented a
series of merchant fee hikes without losing a single large merchant, 47 and
that these merchant fee increases had not been accompanied by equivalent
increases in cardholder rewards. 48 The court highlighted the lack of
merchant attrition in response to these price hikes as evidence of American
Express’s market power.49
American Express’s antisteering rules promised even broader harms, by
encouraging higher merchant fees for other cards, as demonstrated by
Discover’s failed “lowest-cost provider strategy” 50 and by the fact that, even
after eliminating their antisteering rules, Visa and Mastercard had been able
to raise their merchant fees with “virtual impunity” under the umbrella of
41

88 F. Supp. 3d. at 151.
Id. at 174.
43
Id. at 188 (measuring market share by dollar value of transactions using credit cards). In the earlier
Visa case, the Second Circuit found that Mastercard enjoyed market power with a market share of 26%.
See Visa, 344 F.3d at 240.
44
88 F. Supp. 3d. at 188–95.
45
See id. at 212. The court’s assessment of the restraints’ anticompetitive tendency was entwined with
its assessment of direct evidence of competitive harm. See id. at 208.
46
Id. at 209.
47
Id. at 195.
48
Id. at 196.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 151. See also id. at 210 (“The three major networks similarly felt no pressure to lower their
own prices or otherwise respond to Discover’s efforts in the late 1990s to build its share in the network
services market by offering merchants prices well below those charged by its competitors. . . [t]he
failure of Discover’s low-cost provider strategy in the 1990s provides direct evidence of how
antisteering rules like Defendants’ NDPs impede modes of competition that likely would benefit
consumers on both sides of the [credit card] platform.”).
42
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American Express’s rules.51 With no prospect of winning share through
price competition, there was no reason for competitors to lower fees. 52
The court did not ignore consumers on the other side of the platform. 53 It
held that the antisteering rules harmed customers on the other side of the
platform as well, because inflated merchant fees are passed on as higher
retail prices to all customers—American Express cardholders and noncardholders alike54—and most of these customers do not receive sufficient
cardholder benefits to offset the harms.55
The plaintiffs having satisfied their burden with both direct and indirect
evidence, the burden shifted to American Express to prove that the
restraints had procompetitive benefits. American Express claimed two types
of procompetitive justifications for its antisteering rules, but neither was
accepted. First, American Express argued that the rules were “critical” to
preserve “welcome acceptance” of its cards and to maintain its unique
business model, which in turn drove competition in the network services
market.56 In particular, American Express claimed that if merchants were
permitted to “discriminate” at the point of sale by encouraging its
cardholders to use another form of payment, its cardholders would be less
likely to use their cards, not only at the steering merchant, but also at other
merchants.57 The District Court determined that this argument—which
effectively painted freedom from price competition as a benefit rather than a
harm—was not cognizable as a matter of law because it is “axiomatic that
the federal antitrust laws were enacted for the protection of competition, not
competitors.”58
The District Court also rejected the argument that its antisteering rules
prevented merchants from free riding on its cardholder investments and
rewards. The court pointed out that a cardholder would not switch to
another card unless the cardholder believed that “what the merchant offers
is of greater value than the rewards received for using an American Express

51

Id. at 202; see also id. at 216 (“Visa and Mastercard, for instance, were able to increase their average
all-in merchant rates through a variety of means by more than 20% from 1997 to 2009, without fear of
other networks undercutting their prices in order to gain share.”).
52
Id. at 150.
53
As John Newman noted at the time, the judge mentioned cardholders “a whopping 239 times.” John
Newman, Ohio v. American Express Is the Antitrust Case of the Century – So Why Isn’t Anyone Talking
About It?, CONCURRENTIALISTE (Feb. 26, 2018).
54
88 F. Supp. 3d. at 208.
55
Id. at 215.
56
Id. at 225.
57
Id. at 225.
58
Id. at 227.
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card.”59 With respect to American Express’s claimed investments in data
analytics services provided to merchants, the court noted that concerns
about free riding were reduced given that American Express itself sold
those services separately from network services. 60 Finally, the Court
rejected American Express’s argument that the restraints were necessary to
prevent merchants from free-riding on American Express’s investments to
enhance its own brand.61 Indeed, American Express’s own survey data
showed that its “credentialing” effect—the halo of prestige that acceptance
of American Express cards purportedly confers on a merchant—actually
trailed that of its competitors and, in any event, was not the result of
specific investment by American Express and so was not likely to be
impacted by free-riding.62
Lacking any plausible procompetitive benefits, American Express’s
antisteering rules unlawfully restrained competition in the network services
market, and so violated Section 1.
C. Court of Appeals
The District Court’s analysis did not survive review by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, which took a profoundly different view of
the record, the law, and applicable economic principles.
Distinguishing its own separate-markets approach in the earlier Visa case,63
the court held that a single relevant market ought to be defined to include
both the cardholder- and merchant-services sides of the platform. 64 The
court proceeded to outline the types of evidence that would have been
sufficient to satisfy the plaintiff’s initial burden under the rule of reason in
this single, two-sided, market: first, evidence of reduced output (i.e.,
cardholders engaging in fewer credit card transactions than they otherwise
would); second, evidence of reduced quality (i.e., card services worse than
they would otherwise have been); or, third, evidence of supracompetitive
pricing (i.e., American Express’s net, or overall, pricing above competitive
levels).65

59

Id. at 238.
Id. at 236.
61
Id. at 238.
62
Id. at 238.
63
838 F.3d at 198 (“Unlike the contested conduct in this case the contested conduct in Visa occurred
not among different sides of the same network platform, but rather between the platforms
themselves.”).
64
Id.
65
Id. at 205–206.
60
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Applying this standard, the court concluded—in a strikingly brief analysis
that purported to disturb none of the District Court’s careful factual
findings—that there was no evidence of diminished quality, and without a
reliable measure of Amex’s net price, plaintiffs could not show that that
price was supracompetitive.66 And regarding output, the court noted that
transaction volume had increased across the credit card industry throughout
the relevant time, which it viewed as evidence that American Express’s
rules were procompetitive.67 As a result, the plaintiffs had failed to meet
their “initial burden . . . to show that the [antisteering rules] made all Amex
consumers on both sides of the platform—i.e., both merchants and
cardholders—worse off overall.”68 Concluding that the plaintiffs had
accordingly failed to establish a prima facie case, the appellate court
remanded with instructions to enter judgment in favor of American Express.
D. Supreme Court
DOJ elected not to appeal the Second Circuit’s decision, but eleven state
attorneys general pressed on, appealing the direct-evidence case only. 69 In a
relatively brief opinion, the majority endorsed the Second Circuit’s holding
and much of its essential reasoning.70 The Court’s critical holdings are
summarized briefly here and evaluated in Part II.
First, the Court indicated that a formal market definition was a necessary
element of the antitrust analysis in cases involving vertical theories of harm,
noting—apparently without irony—that “[l]egal presumptions that rest on

66

Id. at 206. Of course, while the District Court did not explicitly calculate a net-price, its opinion
includes extensive discussion of Amex’s pricing history and concluded that “by disrupting the pricesetting mechanism ordinarily present in competitive markets, the NDPs reduce American Express’s
incentive—as well as those of Visa, Mastercard, and Discover—to offer merchants lower merchant
fees and, as a result, they impede a significant avenue of horizontal interbrand competition in the
network services market.” 88 F. Supp. 3d. at 207–08.
67
“Increased investment in cardholder rewards has accompanied a dramatic increase in transaction
volume across the entire credit-card industry . . . This evidence of increased output is not only indicative
of a thriving market for credit-card services but is also consistent with evidence that Amex’s
differentiated closed-loop model, supported by its NDPs, has increased rather than decreased
competition overall within the credit-card industry.” 838 F.3d at 206. The Court made no effort to
adjust for the growth of the economy in general, or card-favoring commerce (including e-commerce!)
in particular, over that time.
68
Id. at 205.
69
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (No. 16-1454). See also 138
S. Ct. at 2287.
70
Justice Thomas wrote for the Court on behalf of five Justices, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Kennedy, Alito, and Gorsuch; Justice Breyer dissented for himself and for Justices Ginsburg,
Sotomayor, and Kagan.
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formalistic distinctions rather than actual market realities are generally
disfavored in antitrust law.”71
Second, the Court followed the Second Circuit in holding that the
appropriate market definition in Amex encompassed both consumer- and
merchant-facing sides of the card platform. 72 The Court appeared to believe
that this was required in order to capture the reality that activities on the two
sides were related and to reflect that a price increase on one side alone did
not necessarily mean or imply an increase in overall price.73
But the Court cabined its approach: only some two-sided markets would be
treated for market definition purposes in this way. The “two sides, one
market” approach was appropriate only for “transaction platforms”, defined
as platform businesses that “facilitate a single, simultaneous transaction
between participants.”74 “The key feature” of such businesses, the Court
explained, was that “they cannot make a sale to one side of the platform
without simultaneously making a sale to the other.” 75 A single market
definition was appropriate, in the Court’s view, because: (1) activity on the
two sides was always joint, simultaneous, and in fixed proportions; (2) the
two sides were connected by “more pronounced” network effects and
interrelation of demand and pricing; and (3) “[o]nly other two-sided
platforms can compete with a two-sided platform for transactions.” 76
The Court also held that the plaintiffs had failed to show prima facie
evidence of harm in this unified market. The Court held that to do so
plaintiffs would have had to show that the antisteering rules: (a) increased
the overall price of credit-card transactions above a competitive level, (b)
reduced output (i.e., the number of credit-card transactions), or (c)
otherwise stifled competition in the credit card market.77 According to the
Court, the price evidence did not imply that credit card transactions were
more expensive, overall, than they would be in a competitive market. 78
71

Id. at 2285 (quoting Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 466–67
(1992)). Michael Katz and Douglas Melamed have also pointed out this incongruence. Michael L. Katz
& A. Douglas Melamed, Competition Law as Common Law: American Express and the Evolution of
Antitrust, 168 U. PENN. L. REV. 2061 (2020).
72
Id. at 2286.
73
Id. at 2285–86.
74
Id. at 2286.
75
Id. at 2280 (emphasis added).
76
Id. at 2286–87. The Court’s earlier holding in Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345
U.S. 594 (1953), that the advertiser and reader sides of a newspaper platform should be analyzed
separately, was distinguished on the ground that it did not involve one of these transaction platforms
and its network feedback effects were one-directional. 138 S. Ct. at 2280.
77
Id. at 2287–88.
78
Id. at 2288.
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Evidence that American Express had increased its merchant fees was
inadequate because the increased prices “reflect increases in the value of its
services and the cost of its transactions, not an ability to charge above a
competitive price.”79 The Court pointed out that Visa and Mastercard’s
merchant fees had continued to increase after their consent agreements,
including at merchant locations where American Express was not
accepted.80 In the majority’s view, satisfactory output evidence was not
forthcoming either, as the overall volume of credit-card transactions had
grown by 30 percent from 2008 to 2013.81 The Court was also untroubled
by the tendency of antisteering rules to suppress fee competition. 82 The
Court indicated that merchant fees had in fact decreased by over half since
the 1950s.83
Finally, the Court noted in closing, there was “nothing inherently
anticompetitive about Amex’s antisteering provisions.” 84 The Court revived
American Express’s efficiency argument—rejected by the District Court as
ungrounded in evidence—that the antisteering provisions prevented
merchants from undermining cardholders' expectation of “welcome
acceptance.”85
*
In dissent, Justice Breyer’s began by explaining that market definition is not
required in cases featuring direct evidence of anticompetitive effects, 86
because “proof of actual adverse effects on competition is, a fortiori, proof
of market power.”87 Because plaintiffs had demonstrated that American
Express was able to raise merchant prices repeatedly without any significant

79

Id.
Id. The Court did not discuss why Visa and Mastercard would have incentives to depart from uniform
pricing to offer lower merchant fees at non-American Express locations or whether that type of price
differential would have been practical to implement. The issue of parallel conduct among the three
networks is discussed in Section III.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id. The Court’s citation to the District Court here pointedly omitted evidence from the same page
that, “[w]hen Plaintiffs’ economics expert controlled for the changing composition of Amex’s
merchant base, he found that the network’s average effective merchant fee had, in fact, increased
slightly over time.” 88 F. Supp. at 203.
84
138 S. Ct. at 2289.
85
Id. See also John Newman, Ohio v. American Express: The Good, The Bad, and the Ugly,
CONCURRENTIALISTE (July 16, 2018) (noting that “Justice Thomas came close to outright
misrepresenting the trial record” on this point).
86
138 S. Ct. at 2291 (citing FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459 (1986) (citing 7 P HILLIP
E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1511, p. 429 (3d ed. 1986))).
87
Id. at 2297.
80
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loss of business, formal market definition using indirect evidence was an
unnecessary analytical exercise.88
Justice Breyer also rejected the majority’s definition of a single two-sided
transaction platform market. While acknowledging that such platforms offer
different products or services to different groups of customers whom the
“platform” connects in simultaneous transactions, 89 Breyer explained that
each of those features also describes many other products and services that
have long been analyzed using traditional market definition principles. 90
Finally, the dissent protested, the evidence of harm assembled here was
more than sufficient. The District Court had expressly concluded: (1) that
all consumers, not just Amex cardholders, paid higher retail prices as a
result of the challenged practices; (2) that the restraints excluded
competition and permitted repeated increases in merchant fees; and (3) that
consumers were denied opportunities to accept incentives that merchants
might otherwise have offered to use less-expensive cards. 91 “I should think
that, considering step 1 [of the rule of reason] alone,” concluded Justice
Breyer, “there is little more that need be said.” 92
II. Diagnosis and Prescription: Amex’s Errors, and a Better Approach
The analytical errors of Amex were substantial and unnecessary: a better
approach was available. It appears that the Court was motivated by a fear
that antitrust analysis could too quickly condemn platform conduct that was
beneficial overall but harmful to consumers on a single side of the platform,
and that the Court believed that it was necessary to distort other basic
principles of antitrust analysis—including those relating to market
definition and burdens of proof—in order to protect against this risk. 93
But the Court instead could and should have simply held that, in a welldefined but limited subset of platform cases, multi-market balancing of
effects may be appropriate.94 Doing so would have candidly acknowledged
88

Id. at 2294.
Id. at 2298.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
This concern would be generally consistent with the modern Court’s clear preoccupation with false
positives in antitrust adjudication. See, e.g., Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V.
Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 414 (2004) (“The cost of false positives counsels against an undue
expansion of § 2 liability.”).
94
The Court also pointedly avoided the issue of multi-market balancing in Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n v. Alston, 594 U.S. _ (2021), where it raised but declined to address the argument that “a court
89
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the relevant normative and legal considerations, while preserving the clarity
and integrity of other antitrust principles that now stand needlessly
compromised.
A. Diagnosis: Three Errors
1. An Unforced Error: Requiring Circumstantial Evidence of Market
Definition in a Direct-Evidence Case
The most bizarre of the Amex Court’s errors was its odd insistence on a
formal market definition and market share evidence to establish market
power. It has long been hornbook law that this is not a necessary component
of modern antitrust analysis, and much modern antitrust scholarship
encourages courts and agencies to move beyond the strictures of market
definition where it is possible to do so.95
As the District Court correctly pointed out, plaintiffs have long had two
avenues to satisfy their burden to demonstrate anticompetitive effects under
the first step of the rule of reason in both vertical and horizontal cases.
Plaintiffs may either (a) provide direct evidence of anticompetitive effects,
or (b) provide circumstantial (or indirect) evidence consisting of (i)
demonstrated market power, and (ii) additional indicia that the conduct is
likely to harm competition.96

should not ‘trade off ‘sacrificing a legally cognizable interest in competition in one market to better
promote competition in a different one” and that “review should instead be limited to the particular
market in which antitrust plaintiffs have asserted their injury.” Alston, 594 U.S. at _ (slip op. at 15). Of
course, the Court appeared to reject the idea of multi-market balancing, at least in merger cases, in
Philadelphia National Bank, See generally infra § II.B.1.
95
See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Market Definition: Impossible and Counterproductive, 79 ANTITRUST L.J.
361 (2013); Adriaan ten Kate & Gunnar Niels, The Relevant Market: A Concept Still in Search of a
Definition, 5 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 297, 298 (2009); Steven C. Salop, The First Principles
Approach to Antitrust, Kodak, and Antitrust at the Millenium, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 187 (2000). See also,
Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers: An Economic Alternative
to Market Definition, 10 B.E. J. THEORETICAL ECON. (2010) (“Product differentiation can make
defining the relevant market problematic, notably because products must be ruled ‘in’ or ‘out,’ creating
a risk that the outcome of a merger investigation or case may turn on an inevitably artificial linedrawing exercise”).
96
The District Court in Amex followed the long-standing approach of many other courts. See, e.g.,
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 51 (2001); Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928, 937
(7th Cir. 2000); Rebel Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995); Cont’l Airlines,
Inc. v. United Air Lines, Inc., 120 F. Supp. 2d 556, 567 (E.D. Va. 2000); In re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust
Litig., 433 F. Supp. 3d 274, 300 (D.R.I. 2019); see also Re/Max Int’l, Inc. v. Realty One, Inc., 173 F.3d
995, 1016 (6th Cir. 1999); but see Republic Tobacco Co. v. N. Atl. Trading Co., 381 F.3d 717, 737
(7th Cir. 2004) (noting that “[i]t may be that, in a proper case alleging vertical restraints, a direct
anticompetitive effects analysis could be used to show market power,” but suggesting that the “rough
contours” of a definition should always be required). The agencies have also endorsed this view. See
U.S. Department of Justice & Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines (Aug. 2010).
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Market definition can play an important role in an indirect-evidence case
because one way to demonstrate market power is to show that the defendant
has a substantial share in a relevant market. 97 But market definition is an
analytical step designed to screen for the ability to inflict harm—that is,
market power—and it is widely recognized that direct evidence of actual
anticompetitive effects makes it unnecessary to prove such power
indirectly.98 Accordingly, courts have long held that direct evidence of
anticompetitive effects necessarily implies the existence of sufficient market
power to cause such effects.99
Before Amex, the Supreme Court itself had expressly recognized this
principle. In Indiana Federation of Dentists, a challenge to a decision by a
dentists’ professional organization to restrict insurers’ access to dental xrays, the Court held that “the finding of actual, sustained adverse effects on
competition” obviated the need for formal market definition. 100 But the
Amex Court limited Indiana Federation of Dentists to horizontal cases, and
held that formal market definition is indispensable in vertical cases. 101
“Vertical restraints,” the majority explained, “often pose no risk to
competition unless the entity imposing them has market power, which
cannot be evaluated unless the Court first defines the relevant market.”102
For this proposition, the Court cited its decision in Leegin Creative Leather
Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.,103 as well as Judge Easterbrook’s article
Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason.104
But these sources simply noted the importance of evaluating market power.
They did not endorse a requirement of formal market definition. In fact,
Judge Easterbrook’s article specifically stated that “[a]n inquiry into market
power does not entail the definition of a ‘market,’ a subject that has
bedeviled the law of mergers. Market definition is just a tool in the
investigation of market power.”105 Indeed, direct evidence is normally
97

P. Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, Fundamentals of Antitrust Law § 5.03 [A] (4th ed. 2017).
See, e.g., FTC v. Facebook, Inc., No. 20-3590 (JEB) (D.D.C. June 28, 2021).
99
Justice Breyer’s dissent correctly stated this principle. 138 S. Ct. at 2997 (2018) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (“The District Court’s findings of actual anticompetitive harm from the nondiscrimination
provisions thus showed that, whatever the relevant market might be, American Express had enough
power in that market to cause that harm. There is no reason to require a separate showing of market
definition and market power under such circumstances.”). But see, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, Market Power
Without Market Definition, 90 Notre Dame L. Rev. 31 (2014) (noting confusion regarding the evidence
from which direct effects can in fact be inferred).
100
See Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 461.
101
138 S. Ct. at 2285 n.7.
102
Id.
103
551 U.S. 877 (2007).
104
Frank H. Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 135, 160
(1984).
105
Id. at 160 (emphasis added); see also, e.g., Katz & Sallet, supra note 3, at 2152.
98

16

REBUILDING PLATFORM ANTITRUST

[April 2022

considered more reliable than circumstantial evidence based on market
shares.106
Nor did the argument make economic sense. The Court’s central claim—
that a critical difference exists between horizontal and vertical cases, in that
vertical restraints do not present any risk to competition unless the entity
imposing them has market power—is no difference at all. Horizontal
restraints also do not present any risk to competition unless the participants
collectively enjoy market power. Moreover, direct evidence of market
power has often been used by courts of appeal in vertical cases. 107 And the
Supreme Court has never required a heightened burden of proof of harm,
even for intrabrand vertical restraints.108 Amex involved a restraint that
directly reduced interbrand competition, a category of agreement widely
understood to present competitive dangers.
Ultimately, the market-definition requirement was an unforced error. The
point of the rule of reason is to allow for careful and neutral examination of
evidence and theory specific to a challenged restraint. 109 While antitrust
cases litigated under the rule of reason are already famously challenging for
plaintiffs,110 if the Court was determined to make them harder still, it could
have done so directly by expressly imposing an elevated burden of proof,

106

See, e.g., Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 4 (“Such evidence also may more directly predict the
competitive effects of a merger, reducing the role of inferences from market definition and market
shares.”); see also, e.g., Tim Wu, The Supreme Court Devastates Antitrust Law, N.Y. TIMES (June 26,
2018) (“[T]he court put theory ahead of practice in an absurd way: Even though, in practice, American
Express hurt competition and inflicted harm on consumers, the court concluded, the company was not,
in theory, powerful enough to do so. The logic is ridiculous: You could just as easily say that robbing
banks is economically irrational, given the risks involved, and therefore it does not happen.”).
107
See supra note 96.
108
See, e.g., Leegin, 551 U.S. 877 (2007); GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36; State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S.
3 (1997).
109
Khan, 522 U.S. at 10.
110
See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update for the 21 st Century, 16
GEO. MASON L. REV. 827, 828 (2009) (“Courts dispose of 97% of [rule of reason] cases at the first
stage, on the grounds that there is no anticompetitive effect. They balance in only 2% of cases.”). As
Erik Hovenkamp aptly puts it: “there simply isn’t any room for a large swath of plaintiff-favoring
errors, because plaintiffs almost never win in the first place.” Erik Hovenkamp, Platform Antitrust, 44
J. Corp. L. 713, 752 (2019)
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such as “clear and convincing evidence”111 or “clear showing.”112 If the
Court believed that a two-sided market definition was necessary to achieve
the desired effects analysis, that too is mistaken, as we discuss below.
2. Market Definition: Breaking the Substitutability Principle
Having determined that a formal market definition was necessary, the Court
next turned to what that definition ought to be. The traditional touchstone
for this exercise is the principle of demand-side substitutability. The
Supreme Court long ago instructed that “[t]he outer boundaries of a product
market are determined by the reasonable interchangeability of use or the
cross-elasticity of demand between the product itself and substitutes for
it.”113 In other words, a market contains the relevant product or service, plus
whatever other products and services are reasonably substitutable for it. 114
Failure to define a market by reference to this principle is normally fatal to
an antitrust claim.115
The logic underlying this approach is simple. Market definition is an effort
to identify market power by identifying the set of competitive constraints
that would make it unprofitable for a firm or group of firms to impose
supracompetitive prices or other worsened terms of dealing. 116 Courts and
agencies test whether an actual or hypothetical monopolist supplier of a
particular set of products or services would be able profitably to implement
a significant price increase above competitive levels.117 This exercise
should be conducted with an eye to the specific competitive concerns at
111

See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984) (requiring that antitrust
plaintiff in vertical price-fixing case “present direct or circumstantial evidence that reasonably tends to
prove that the manufacturer and others had a conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to
achieve an unlawful objective”) (internal quotations omitted); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986) (requiring plaintiff to “show that the inference of conspiracy is
reasonable in light of the competing inferences of independent action or collusive action that could not
have harmed respondents”). In both cases the court required that the plaintiff show evidence “that tends
to exclude the possibility” that the alleged conspirators acted independently. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at
588 (citing Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 764).
112
See, e.g., United States v. Philadelphia Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963).
113
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962). See also, e.g., United States v. E. I. du
Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 404 (1956); Sharif Pharmacy, Inc. v. Prime Therapeutics, LLC,
950 F.3d 911, 918 (7th Cir. 2020); Lifewatch Servs. Inc. v. Highmark Inc., 902 F.3d 323, 337 (3d Cir.
2018).
114
NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85, 111 (1984).
115
See, e.g., Shah v. VHS San Antonio Partners, LLC, 985 F.3d 450, 455 (5th Cir. 2021) (“Shah’s
proposed relevant market does not encompass all interchangeable substitute products because it does
not include the two non-BHS facilities that the BHS parties contend serve as viable alternatives to
BHS facilities.”).
116
See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, Market Definition: An Analytical Overview, 74 ANTITRUST L. J. 129
(2007).
117
See Horizontal Merger Guidelines ¶ 4.1.
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issue in each individual case. Thus, different theories of harm might imply
different market definitions, even in the same antitrust case, but demandside substitutability remains central. 118
Even the handful of “special” market definition tools derive from demandside substitutability. “Cluster” markets, for example, are aggregations of
multiple traditionally-defined markets, treated together, shorthand-style, for
analytical convenience (e.g., various different outpatient services supplied
by the same hospitals under the same competitive conditions). 119 “Bundle”
markets exist when a consumers demand a set of products or services
together and where substitution involves the entire set (e.g., gloves,
silverware sets, or automobiles).120 Likewise, courts sometimes define
“price discrimination” markets that distinguish among customers by
reference to differences in their ability or incentive to turn to substitute
products or services.121 Finally, “supply-side substitution” may inform
market definition in a limited way, by including in a relevant market
defined on the basis of substitution those firms that do not currently produce
reasonable demand-side substitutes, but could do so rapidly and at low
cost.122 None of these variants diminishes the primacy of demand-side
substitutability.123 As the District Court also noted, courts had applied the
substitutability principle to credit card market definition in previous
cases.124
118

Steven C. Salop, The First Principles Approach to Antitrust, Kodak, and Antitrust at the Millenium,
68 ANTITRUST L.J. 187 (2000). See also Gregory J. Werden, Four Suggestions on Market Delineation,
37 ANTITRUST BULL. 107, 108–12 (1992) (“Assuring that markets are suitable for the purposes to which
they are put requires that a preliminary step be taken before market delineation. This step is the
identification of who might exercise market power, against whom it might be exercised, and how it
might be exercised.”). See, e.g., Olin Corp. v. FTC, 986 F.2d 295, 1299, 1301 (9th Cir. 1993); Staley
v. Gilead Sciences, Inc., 446 F. Supp. 3d 578, 616 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (“[I]t is not unreasonable for
Plaintiffs to have identified two different product markets because they have claimed harm to
competition in two different ways.”).
119
See Krisha A. Cerilli, Staples / Office Depot: Clarifying Cluster Markets, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L
(Aug. 2016).
120
Kevin Hahm & Loren K. Smith, Clarifying Bundle Markets and Distinguishing Them from Cluster
Markets, ANTITRUST SOURCE (Feb. 2021).
121
See, e.g., FTC v. Sysco Corp., 113 F. Supp. 3d 1, 39 (D.D.C. 2015) (“The concern underlying price
discrimination markets is that certain types of captured or dedicated customers could be targeted for
monopolist pricing even if a price increase for all customers would not be profitable.”).
122
See, e.g., FTC v. RAG-Stiftung, 436 F. Supp. 3d 278, 293–94 (D.D.C. 2020); Horizontal Merger
Guidelines § 5.1 (Aug. 2010).
123
Likewise, in other cases involving complementary products and competitive harm—including tying
cases—antitrust courts and agencies do not define a single market to include both the tying and tied
products. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
124
In the early 2000s, the DOJ successfully challenged Visa and MasterCard’s exclusivity rules, which
prohibited their member banks from issuing American Express cards or Discover cards. Visa, 344 F.3d
at 234. The Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s conclusion on relevant product market that

April 2022]

REBUILDING PLATFORM ANTITRUST

19

The Amex majority started from the broad proposition that market definition
is intended to reflect “the area of effective competition,” that is, the “arena
within which significant substitution in consumption or production occurs,”
taking account of “commercial realities.” 125 The Court then defined a single
“two-sided” market encompassing both services to cardholders and services
to merchants, even though services to cardholders are not substitutable for
services to merchants.126 The Court reasoned that indirect network effects
required assessment of both sides of the platform in order to “accurately
assess competition.”127 Due to these network effects, the majority
cautioned, a price increase on one side did not necessarily imply an overall
increase in the cost of the platform’s services without testing for an
offsetting beneficial effect on the other side of the platform. 128
Indirect network effects clearly are important to the functioning of a
platform like Amex, or any other two-sided platform. Likewise, an antitrust
assessment should accurately reflect the nature and scope of any such
effects. But these propositions do not require or justify combining both
sides of the platform into a single antitrust market.
Consider the observation that prices and demand on the two sides of the
platform were interrelated. It is true that if a platform serves two types of
customers who each use the platform to transact with customers of the other
type, then an increase in prices to one type could reduce demand for the
platform’s services from both types of customers through a negative
feedback loop, limiting the profitability of such an increase. 129
Thus, the Court was correct to point out that a price increase to customers
on one side of a platform does not necessarily imply overall competitive
harm, but that observation does not compel a novel approach to market
definition. That a nominal price increase could have either a benign or a
sinister explanation is not unique to multi-sided platforms; it is a common
phenomenon. More generally, the relevant market definition need not
there are “two interrelated, but separate, product markets”: (1) “the general purpose card market,
consisting of the market for charge cards and credit cards,” and (2) “the network services market for
general purpose cards.” Id. at 238–39. As the District Court explained, “general purpose card network
services . . . “constitute a product market because merchant consumers exhibit little price sensitivity
and the networks provide core services that cannot reasonably be replaced by other sources.” Id.
125
138 S. Ct. at 2285. Cf. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. at 593 (“area of effective
competition”); Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 336 (1962) (geographic market must correspond to
“commercial realities”).
126
Id. at 2287.
127
Id. As discussed later, the Court also erred by saying that “[o]nly other two-sided platforms can
compete with a two-sided platform for transactions.”
128
Id. at 2286.
129
Id. at 2285.
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include all business activity that could affect price (or output, quality,
innovation, etc.). For example, a change in the price of a product or service
could result from a change in the supply or price of a complementary good,
but antitrust analysis has never for that reason included complements in the
relevant market.130
Worse still, the Court’s approach compromises the analytical function
of the market definition exercise.131 As Jonathan Sallet and Michael Katz
have pointed out, a separate-markets approach allows more precise
measurement of competitive conditions, which may differ significantly
from one side of a platform to another.132 For example, an ad-supported
newspaper may be the only newspaper in town, but might compete on the
advertising side with other forms of advertising, as explained in Lorain
Journal.133 Aggregation of distinct groups of consumers into a single
market impairs rather than facilitates granular assessment of competitive
realities and thus undermines the utility of market definition. 134
3. An Illogical Limiting Principle: Transaction Platforms
In what seems to be an effort to cabin the broader reach of its reasoning and
to distinguish its own earlier cases, 135 the Court confined its novel approach
to a special subset of platforms -- “transaction platforms” – where
merchants and cardholders use the platform’s payment services jointly,
simultaneously, and in fixed proportions.136 Such transaction platforms
“exhibit more pronounced indirect network effects and interconnected
pricing and demand” than other platforms and, according to the Court,

130

See Jonathan B. Baker, Market Definition: An Analytical Overview, 74 ANTITRUST L. J. 129, 134
n.30 (2007) (“[T]he significance for competitive effects of demand complementarities should not be
accounted for in the market definition step of the analytical process . . . . Rather, the significance of
demand complementarities should be accounted for in the later analysis of competitive effects.”). See
also Steven Salop, The First Principles Approach to Antitrust, Kodak, And Antitrust at the Millennium,
68 ANTITRUST L. J. 187 (2000).
131
138 S. Ct. at 2285 n.7.
132
Michael Katz & Jonathan Sallet, Multisided Markets and Antitrust Enforcement, 127 YALE L.J.
2142, 2158 (2018) (“As demonstrated for both advertising-supported media platforms and transaction
platforms, the single-market approach fails to accurately account for product substitution and
competitive conditions in multisided platform industries.”).
133
342 U.S. 143 (1951).
134
See, e.g., FTC v. Indiana Fed. of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460 (1986) (purpose of market definition
is to “determine whether an arrangement has the potential for genuine adverse effects on competition”);
Daniel Francis & Jay Ezrielev, Disaggregating Market Definition: AmEx and a Plural View of Market
Definition, 98 Neb. L. J. 460, 479 (2019) (“If the defendant cannot injure the competitive process, there
is no need to go further and dig into the complexities and burdens of working out whether it has in fact
done so.”).
135
Such cases include Lorain Journal as well as Times-Picayune, 345 U.S. 594.
136
138 S. Ct. at 2286.
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supply only one product that is jointly consumed by both types of
consumers.137
However, the concept of ‘transaction platforms” as a limiting principle
leaves much to be desired.138 Many platforms exhibit indirect network
effects of some kind.139 Non-transaction platforms with significant indirect
network effects are legion: in the digital economy, these include content
streaming and sharing platforms of all kinds; in the brick-and-mortar
economy, one need look no further than economists’ standard example of
heterosexual singles bars.140 In those cases, indirect network effects may
play a very important—even indispensable—role in appraising competitive
effects. The Court offered no explanation why “transaction platforms”
should be treated as a special category for the purpose of effects assessment.
And, of course, the “share of transactions” would be identical regardless of
whether transactions were counted on one side or both.
Moreover, even credit card platforms are not pristine transaction platforms
as defined by the Court. Credit card networks provide competitively
relevant membership services that are not consumed jointly, including
revolving credit, entertainment benefits, and information services to
cardholders, and analytic services to merchants. 141 Thus, it seems that
American Express’s own services were not consumed by cardholders and
merchants in a purely joint and simultaneous fashion. Thus, distinguishing a
two-sided “transaction platform” from other platforms seems destined to be
a wellspring of confusion—and litigation.
The Court was equally misguided in commenting that “[o]nly other twosided platforms can compete with a two-sided platform for transactions.” 142
For example, a two-sided booking platform like Hotels.com, which would
appear to satisfy the Court’s definition of a transaction platform, may
137

Id.
Nevertheless, despite the economics, this distinction may play a helpful role in understanding the
limits of the Amex holding itself, as we suggest below. See infra § II.B.
139
See, e.g., Gunnar Niels, Transaction Versus Non-Transaction Platforms: A False Dichotomy In
Two-Sided Market Definition, 15 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 327 (2019) (“There exists a spectrum of
interactions between the two sides [of a platform], with transactions simply being at one end of the
spectrum, and ‘mere’ interactions of various sorts on the other. What matters for market definition is
the nature of the externalities between the two sides and how the platform operator takes these
externalities into account when setting prices.”).
140
Id.
141
See, e.g., Platinum Card, AM. EXPRESS, https://card.americanexpress.com/d/platinum-card/; Visa
Consulting & Analytics, VISA, https://usa.visa.com/partner-with-us/visa-consulting-analytics.html;
Authentication Services, MASTERCARD, https://www.mastercard.us/en-us/business/overview/safetyand-security/authentication-services.html.
142
138 S. Ct. at 2287.
138
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compete with individual hotel websites and telephone calls, which are not
platforms at all.
The error of this latter proposition soon became painfully obvious. In April
2020, Judge Stark of the District of Delaware rejected the DOJ’s challenge
to the acquisition of Farelogix by Sabre.143 Historically, airlines relied
primarily on booking services provided by Sabre and two other global
distribution systems (“GDS”) to sell tickets to travel agents. 144 Farelogix
offered an alternative booking services solution that allowed airlines to
bypass the GDSs and connect directly to travel agencies. 145 Farelogix’s
products work with a new technology standard, New Distribution
Capability, which allows airlines to make a broader, more personalized
range of offers to travelers booking through travel agencies. 146 Sabre had
vigorously opposed this new technology in the market and in industry
groups before changing tactics and agreeing to purchase Farelogix. 147 DOJ
sued to block the acquisition.
Judge Stark refused to enjoin the deal, holding that DOJ had failed to
establish a prima facie case because it had failed to properly identify a
relevant market.148 It was clear that the combination of Farelogix-plusairlines would allow airlines to disintermediate Sabre. Yet, citing Amex, the
court held that, as a matter of law, Sabre (a two-sided transaction
platform)149 could only compete with other two-sided platforms. 150
Farelogix only provides services to airlines and was, therefore, not a twosided platform.151 So, despite evidence that Sabre actually viewed Farelogix
as a competitive threat through its relationship with airlines, the court
determined that the two firms were not competitors. 152 At trial, the DOJ
attempted to limit Amex to the credit card industry, but Judge Stark did not

143

United States v. Sabre Corp., 452 F. Supp. 3d 97 (D. Del. 2020).
Id. at 110.
145
Id. at 113.
146
Id. at 112.
147
Id. at 105.
148
Id. at 136.
149
The court was following the precedent established by the Second Circuit in US Airways, Inc. v.
Sabre Holdings Corp., 938 F.3d 43.
150
452 F. Supp. 3d at 136.
151
Id.
152
Id. at 118 (“[A] preponderance of the evidence shows that Sabre and Farelogix do view each other
as competitors, although only in a limited fashion. Sabre considers Farelogix a competitor in
developing NDC technology for direct connects.”).
144
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believe that the Amex opinion provided any rationale for such a limitation
and maintained that he was bound by the precedent. 153
As Sabre demonstrates, Amex has opened a door to the broader erosion of
the substitutability principle, and that door may prove hard to shut. The path
is now marked for lower courts to depart from substitutability for whichever
reasons might seem persuasive to them. Today, many businesses and
litigation defendants—in industries from ridesharing154 to collegiate
athletics155—are arguing that they should benefit from the “Amex
exception.”156 As Erik Hovenkamp points out, there are “no potential
defendants who would not benefit from this.” 157 Some of those claims have
been and will be accepted, and what was previously an antitrust axiom—
markets are defined based on meaningful substitutes—will steadily erode. 158
This is a harmful outcome. Legal certainty and analytical coherence will
suffer; private and governmental plaintiffs will face more risk and will be
deterred from bringing meritorious challenges, reducing deterrence; courts
will face growing confusion; and businesses will find it harder to measure
the legality of their planned conduct.
B. Prescription: Balancing in Platform Cases
These errors of Amex were needless. The Court could instead have
acknowledged evidence of market power on one side, retained the
substitutability-based approach to market definition, and avoided dubious
economic distinctions, and it could have done so while recognizing the

153

Id. at 137. The DOJ is partly to blame for this outcome because it framed the merger as horizontal,
rather than vertical or horizontal-plus-vertical. It was the relationship between Farelogix and the
airlines that exerted competitive pressure on Sabre. Farelogix allowed the airlines to disintermediate
Sabre and serve travel agencies directly. Analyzing this disintermediation as a vertical issue would
have been much more sensible and may have avoided the issue of whether one-sided products can
compete with two-sided platforms.
154
See SC Innovations, Inc. v. Uber Techs., Case No. 18-cv-07440-JCS, 2020 WL 2097611 (N.D. Cal.
May. 1, 2020).
155
Alston, 594 U. S. __.
156
See, e.g., Ted Tatos, Relevant Market Definition and Multi-Sided Platforms After Ohio v. American
Express: Evidence from Recent NCAA Antitrust Litigation, J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 147, 148–49 (2019).
157
Erik Hovenkamp, Platform Antitrust, 44 J. Corp. L. 713, 752 (2019). Chris Sagers predicted this at
the time of Amex itself. Chris Sagers, Ohio v. American Express: Clarence Thomas Sets Sail on a Sea
of Doubt, and, Mirabile Dictu, It’s Still a Bad Idea, PROMARKET (June 27, 2018) (“[W]e can expect
every antitrust defendant and their sister to start claiming that their business is two-sided, and lower
courts will find reason within the theory to give their claims the time of day.”).
158
One of us has argued elsewhere that the substitutability principle could be reconciled with Amex
only by splitting the market definition tool itself. See Francis & Ezrielev, supra note 143, at 479.
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close economic relationship between the two sides of the American Express
platform.
By insisting on a single market definition encompassing both sides, the
Court was able to avoid making (or at least admitting to) this exception, and
was able to place the burden on the plaintiff, rather than the defendant, to
figure out whether the acknowledged harms were in fact offset by claimed
benefits.159 The Court instead should have crafted a limited exception to the
rule against multi-market balancing that is narrowly tailored and consistent
with existing law, including the law of burdens of proof.
1. The Traditional Rule Against Multi-Market Balancing
Benefits in one market cannot normally be invoked to justify harms in
another market. This rule certainly governs merger cases. 160 And while the
Supreme Court has not been entirely clear, there is a basis for thinking that
it applies also in conduct cases.161 Justice Breyer acknowledged in dissent
that “[a] Sherman Act § 1 defendant can rarely, if ever, show that a procompetitive benefit in the market for one product offsets an anticompetitive
harm in the market for another.”162 The District Court also nodded at the
same difficulty.163
This principle implicates some important tensions in the design and
application of antitrust rules. On the one hand, the rule prevents antitrust
cases from becoming unwieldly, if not limitless, as they would be if every
possible impact on every possible consumer group had to be measured or
159

Herbert Hovenkamp, Platforms and the Rule of Reason: The American Express Case, 2019
COLUMBIA BUS. L. REV. 35, 60 (2019) (“What the . . . majority was apparently trying to do is force the
plaintiff to consider burdens and benefits on both sides of the platform as part of its prima facie case.”).
160
See Philadelphia Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 371 (“[A] merger the effect of which ‘may be substantially
to lessen competition’ is not saved because, on some ultimate reckoning of social or economic debits
and credits, it may be deemed beneficial.”).
161
Justice Breyer’s dissent quoted from United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
While the Topco Court was focused on the distinction between intrabrand and interbrand competition,
Topco’s antipathy to broad balancing is clear. See Topco, 405 U.S. at 610–12 (citing Philadelphia Nat’l
Bank). Commentators differ regarding the existence and desirability of the rule for conduct cases.
Compare Gregory J. Werden, Cross-Market Balancing of Competitive Effects: What Is the Law, and
What Should It Be? 43 J. Comp. L. 119 (2017) with Jonathan B. Baker, THE ANTITRUST PARADIGM
(2019) 191.
162
See 138 S. Ct. at 2302–03 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“American Express might face an uphill battle.
A Sherman Act § 1 defendant can rarely, if ever, show that a pro-competitive benefit in the market for
one product offsets an anticompetitive harm in the market for another[.]”).
163
88 F. Supp. 3d. at 229 (“As a general matter, however, a restraint that causes anticompetitive harm
in one market may not be justified by greater competition in a different market. Whether this rule
precludes jointly weighing the relative gains and losses to Interbrand competition in two separate, yet
interrelated, markets that together comprise a single two-sided platform has yet to be explicitly
considered by the Second Circuit.”).
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predicted before adjudication could take place. It is also consistent with
formulations of the goal of antitrust as providing consumers in a relevant
market with the benefit of competition for their business. 164 Price
discrimination markets underscore the antitrust policy of protecting injured
consumer subgroups even if other consumers are unharmed or benefited by
the challenged conduct.165
One the other hand, the rule directs a court to ignore effects on some
consumers, which can lead the court to condemn conduct that is beneficial
to consumers in some overall sense.166 Thus, it is in some tension with the
central purpose of rule of reason analysis, which is to determine the overall
competitive effects of challenged conduct.167 The rule also invites the
criticism of formalism, to the extent that it treats effects in the relevant
market dissimilarly from effects outside that market. Because market
definition is not necessary in every case, and may rest on legal formalisms
rather than economic realities, one might fairly be uneasy that this brightline distinction is doing so much heavy lifting. 168
The question of whether and how to compare harms to some participants
against benefits to others is not unique to multi-market platform cases.
Consider retail price maintenance agreements (“RPM”), which can be
justified when they make it possible to provide better services to
consumers.169 In those cases, there can be conflicting effects within the
single market. Suppose that only some of the consumers in the relevant
market value the additional services, while all customers pay the resulting
164

See, e.g., Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not
Increasing Efficiency, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 191, 192 (2008) (“The fundamental goal of antitrust, in
other words, is to protect consumers in the relevant market from anticompetitive behavior that exploits
them—that unfairly transfers their wealth to firms with market power—not to increase the total wealth
of society”) (emphasis added); id. at 217 (“[T]he Court [has] signaled that the ultimate aim of antitrust
law is to enhance the wellbeing of consumers in the relevant market[.]”) (emphasis added).
165
See, e.g., R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 120 F.T.C. 36 (1995).
166
See, e.g., Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 479 (“We need not decide whether Kodak’s behavior has any
procompetitive effects and, if so, whether they outweigh the anticompetitive effects. We note only that
Kodak’s service and parts policy is simply not one that appears always or almost always to enhance
competition, and therefore to warrant a legal presumption without any evidence of its actual economic
impact.”).
167
See, e.g., 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. FTC, No. 18-3848, 2021 WL 2385274, at *7 (2d Cir. June 11,
2021) (testing for “net procompetitive effect” under rule of reason); In re Sulfuric Acid Antitrust Litig.,
703 F.3d 1004, 1011 (7th Cir. 2012) (focusing on “net effect on economic welfare”); Smith v. Pro
Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (rule of reason analysis involves identifying
anticompetitive and procompetitive effects and “net[ting] them out”).
168
See supra Section II.A.1. See also Michael Katz & Jonathan Sallet, Multisided Platforms and
Antitrust Enforcement, 127 YALE L.J. 2142, 2154 (2018) (“[O]ne should be very wary of putting too
much weight on market definition itself as a driver of the key conclusions.”).
169
See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 890–91 (noting that RPM agreements may stimulate interbrand
competition).
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higher nominal price. RPM would thus benefit the consumers who value the
services but would harm those who do not.170 This raises a fairness
question: if there are only a few customers who value the services, should
the RPM be considered beneficial overall? 171 And—crucially—should that
conclusion change if we conclude instead that the two groups of customers
represent two distinct relevant markets?
Commentators can and do differ about the right answer to these
questions.172 The Horizontal Merger Guidelines provide support for
reasonably circumscribed departures from the rule against multi-market
balancing in the agencies’ exercise of prosecutorial discretion when the
benefits far exceed the harms.173
2. Some First Principles for Platform Balancing
In the context of multisided platforms, balancing harms and benefits on one
side with harms and benefits on another side may be appropriate in certain,
carefully prescribed and limited, circumstances. The Court’s observation
that effects on multiple sides of a platform business are often closely
interconnected as a causal matter, and that antitrust analysis ought not

170

Herbert Hovenkamp, Platforms and the Rule of Reason: The American Express Case, 2019
COLUMBIA BUS. L. REV. 35, 45–46 (2019) (noting that antisteering rules deprive customers of the
opportunity to choose between a lower-price, lower-benefit product and a higher-price, higher-benefit
product, which—as consumers value perks differently—harms some). Compare, e.g., Christopher R.
Leslie, Predatory Pricing and Recoupment, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 1695, 1720–32 (2013) (noting that the
benefits of predatory pricing and the harms of recoupment may occur in different markets, thus
affecting different consumer groups).
171
It has been assumed by some commentators that the “overall” effect can be gauged by the effect on
market output. If output increased, it was assumed that consumers are benefited overall, and harmed
overall if market output falls. However, economists have known for decades that this assumption is
incorrect if the value of services is not identical across all consumers. Under those circumstances,
basing the comparison on the effects on total output is a defective approach. The benefits of the services
to consumers “at the margin” may lead to an increase in output. But the harms to the inframarginal
consumers may far more than exceed the benefits to the marginal consumers. See William Comanor,
The Two Economics of Vertical Restraints, 5 REV. INDUS. ORG. 99, 107 (1990); John M. Newman, The
Output-Welfare Fallacy: A Modern Antitrust Paradox, 107 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2022). But see
Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Harm and Causation, Wash. U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2021) (“There are
good reasons for preferring output rather than price as the primary indicator of consumer welfare.”).
Measuring output is also fraught with other difficulties since the proper measure is “volume” in units,
not revenue in dollars. Output also may increase or decrease secularly as demand changes over time,
so it is necessary to “control” for these effects in order to properly measure the effect of the conduct.
172
For a thoughtful overview, see Daniel A. Crane, Balancing Effects Across Markets, 80 Antitrust L.J.
391 (2015). See also Stephen F. Ross, The Misunderstood Alliance between Sports Fans, Players, and
the Antitrust Laws, U. ILL. L. REV. 519, 540–541 (1997) (“[T]he Court’s antitrust jurisprudence shows
that quality-enhancing agreements are reasonable even if they make some parties worse off.”).
173
See, e.g., Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 10 n.14 (“Inextricably linked efficiencies are most likely
to make a difference when they are great and the likely anticompetitive effect in the relevant market(s)
is small so the merger is likely to benefit customers overall.”)
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neglect this reality has some force.174 But the question of whether and when
to compare effects should—consistent with the axioms of antitrust
analysis—turn on economic substance, not on the formalism of market
definition. For similar reasons, simply classifying a business as a platform
should not set off a free-for-all. Instead, analysis should be structured and
guided by the three principles described below.
We also acknowledge that the economic literature on two-sided markets has
not reached consensus on the definition of a “platform.”175 As Katz and
Sallet show, virtually any business can be shoehorned into some definition
of a “platform.”176 For these purposes, we will accept the Supreme Court’s
definition of a platform as a business that “offers different products or
services to two different groups who both depend on the platform to
intermediate between them,”177 with the caveat that there may be more than
two sides in some cases.
Instead of the Court’s mangled approach of defining a single two-sided
platform market, we propose that it makes more sense to balance crossplatform harms and benefits experienced by consumers on the two sides of
the platform, defined as two separate markets, pursuant to the following
principles.178 First, “other side” effects should be counted only if they are
sufficiently causally connected to the challenged restraint. Second, a
defendant must do more than just name a plausible justification: it must
prove actual offsetting beneficial effects are of sufficient magnitude to
174

See generally, e.g., Michael Katz, Exclusionary Conduct in Multi-Sided Markets, Note for OECD
Hearing on Re-thinking The Use of Traditional Antitrust Enforcement Tools in Multi-Sided Markets
(Nov. 15, 2017) (highlighting complexities in analysis of exclusionary conduct in markets with
multisided businesses).
175
See, e.g., Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report, 37 RAND J.
ECON. 645–67 (2006). Rochet and Tirole defined a market as two-sided “if the platform can affect the
volume of transactions by charging more to one side of the market and reducing the price paid by the
other in an equal amount; in other words, the price structure matters, and platforms must design it so
as to bring both sides on board.” Evans and Schmalensee, by contrast, defined a two-sided market to
be one that “has (a) two or more groups of customers; (b) who need each other in some way; (c) but
who cannot capture the value from their mutual attraction on their own; and (d) rely on the catalyst to
facilitate value creating interactions between them.” David S. Evans and Richard Schmalensee,
Markets with Two-Sided Platforms, in 1 ISSUES IN COMPETITION L. AND POL’Y 667 (2008).
176
Katz & Sallet, supra note 141, at 2149–51 (“Almost any firm selling an input to a manufacturer
would prefer that the manufacturer have more customers, as then the manufacturer will demand more
of the input.”). Thus, someone might argue that virtually all firms (whether digital or brick-and-mortar)
should be treated as platforms on the grounds that they buy inputs and sell products, a definition that
would destroy usual market definition principles.
177
138 S. Ct. at 2280.
178
The limitation to “other sides” of a single platform business helps, among other things, to avoid the
analysis becoming unwieldy or unmanageable, or to avoid a court having to entertain arguments about
so-called “butterfly effects.” It does, however, include all effects in markets where the platform is
active, including effects on those not literally purchasing from the platform.
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overcome the harms. And, third, when a court departs from the standard
single-market rule to assess the benefits enjoyed on another side of the
platform, it must also consider any other reasonably ascertainable effects of
the challenged conduct, good and bad, on any side of the platform. On this
approach, antitrust markets on each side of the platform would be defined
according to traditional substitutability-based principles and could involve
special analytical tools (like price-discrimination markets) in appropriate
cases.
First, the requirement of causal connection between harms and benefits is a
crucial limiting factor. Courts should not entertain arguments about benefits
that would be provided absent the restraint or through significantly less
restrictive means.179 In drawing a line, courts should heed guidance in the
agencies’ 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, which acknowledges that, as
a matter of prosecutorial discretion, the agencies will consider out-ofmarket benefits in a merger review only if those benefits are “inextricably
linked” with the harms, such that they would be lost if the harmful effect
were prohibited.180
Limiting balancing to causally connected effects—considering only benefits
that a defendant proves would not be achieved if the restraint were
prohibited—makes both economic and legal sense. If a claimed benefit
could be achieved without a restraint that causes consumer harm, then there
is no need to tolerate the consumer harm to achieve the consumer benefit. 181
This approach also serves the ultimate goal of the rule of reason—to assess
the overall effect of a challenged restraint—and fits existing guidance and
enforcement practices in merger enforcement. 182 The 2010 Horizontal
Merger Guidelines also explain the agencies will consider out-of-market
benefits in a merger review only if those benefits would be substantial
relative to harms.183
Second, regarding the allocation of burdens of proof within the rule of
reason framework, generally plaintiffs should have the burden of showing
179

Alston, 594 U.S. at __ (slip op. at 28) (“[H]owever framed and at whichever step, anticompetitive
restraints of trade may wind up flunking the rule of reason to the extent the evidence shows that
substantially less restrictive means exist to achieve any proven procompetitive benefits.”) (citing 7
PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1505, p. 428 (4th ed. 2017)).
180
Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 10 n.14 (emphasis added).
181
The Horizontal Merger Guidelines require the existence of “merger-specific efficiencies.” See
Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 10 (“The Agencies credit only those efficiencies likely to be
accomplished with the proposed merger and unlikely to be accomplished in the absence of either the
proposed merger or another means having comparable anticompetitive effects.”).
182
Id; see also Francis & Ezrielev, supra note 143, at 480–85 (emphasizing the benefits of causationbased limits for effects analysis in platform cases).
183
Id.
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harms and defendants should have the burden of showing benefits. To
satisfy the burden of showing redeeming beneficial effects, a defendant
should not be able to simply invoke the specter of procompetitive benefits.
It also must demonstrate that such benefits exist and are of sufficient
magnitude to overcome the harms proven by the plaintiff. It must also be
reasonably possible for the court to evaluate and weigh the evidence
provided by each party.184
The Supreme Court’s approach in Amex defied this allocation principle.
Because of its contorted market definition, the Court effectively required
plaintiffs to not only prove anticompetitive harm but also to disprove any
plausible procompetitive benefit in order to satisfy its prima facie case.185
This is backwards. The defendant has much better access to evidence of
benefits; forcing a plaintiff to disprove the sufficiency of every possibly
invoked justification would undesirably redouble an already forbidding
evidentiary burden.186 Finally, maintaining this burden on the defendant is
consistent with the longstanding approach under the rule of reason that the
defendant prove that benefits in the same market side offset apparent harms
in that market.187 Claims of benefit should not be analyzed more favorably
simply because they fall on a different side of the platform.
Third, when analyzing cross-platform effects, both benefits and harms on
all sides of the platform should be counted. Suppose that the plaintiff
alleges harms from the restraint suffered by consumers in a market on one
side of the platform and the defendant asks a court to consider a benefit
enjoyed by a particular customer group on the other side of the platform. In
this case, the court should also consider effects on other consumer groups
on other sides of the platform reasonably connected to the challenged
conduct. Burdens of proof regarding these effects should follow the

184

See Andrew I. Gavil & Steven C. Salop, Probability, Presumptions and Evidentiary Burdens in
Antitrust Analysis: Revitalizing the Rule of Reason for Exclusionary Conduct, 168 U. PENN. L. REV.
2107 (2020). Courts do not always demonstrate adequate concern for the magnitude of the benefit
offered by the defendant at step two. See, e.g., Capital Imaging v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assoc, 996
F.2d 537, 543 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating that the defendant, once the burden shifts to them, must “offer
evidence of the pro-competitive ‘redeeming virtues’ of their combination,” and that “[a]ssuming
defendant comes forward with such proof,” the plaintiff once again assumes the burden of production”).
For a thoughtful overview, see generally John M. Newman, Procompetitive Justifications in Antitrust
Law, 94 IND. L.J. 501 (2019).
185
138 S. Ct. at 2288.
186
See Herbert Hovenkamp, Platforms and the Rule of Reason: The American Express Case, 2019
COLUMBIA BUS. L. REV. 35, 57 (2019) (noting that a defendant “is in a far better position” to provide
such evidence). See also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 218 (1960) (“[A]s a practical matter, it
is never easy to prove a negative.”).
187
4A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1040 (4th ed. 2016).
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ordinary rules: benefits are for the defendant to prove, and harms are for the
plaintiff.
This symmetry rule will not affect the outcome in every case. 188 But in
many cases, it will matter: a restraint may simultaneously harm some
participants, and benefit others, on each side of the platform. As discussed
in Part III, this seems to have been exactly the impact in Amex itself: some
consumers (namely, some American Express cardholders) were benefited,
but other cardholders were also harmed.189
3. Allocating Burdens Correctly
Effects balancing is often described as the third step of the rule of reason,
but we think it is best integrated into the second stage of rule-of-reason
analysis.190 To discharge its burden at this stage, the defendant should be
required to show not only that the procompetitive justification is applicable,
valid and non-pretextual, but also that it is sufficient in magnitude to offset
the competitive harms.191 This approach avoids the false negative errors that
can result if a defendant must only identify a qualitative benefit to its own
business before a plaintiff is required to quantify that benefit and set it off
against overall harms.192
The quantum of evidence that should be required for a defendant to
discharge this burden also is a function of the plaintiff’s own evidentiary
showing. A feather of justification evidence should not be sufficient to
trump a pound of evidence of harm. 193 However, if the plaintiff has
188

For example, suppose that small marketplace platform requires vendors to use its lower cost logistics
system while charging a supracompetitve fee, which is found to lead to lower merchandise prices, and
these lower prices are matched by the larger platforms.
189
138 S. Ct. at 2288.
190
See, e.g., U.S. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 322.
191
See, e.g., United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 678 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[T]he district court was
obliged to more fully investigate the procompetitive and noneconomic justifications proffered by MIT
than it did when it performed the truncated rule of reason analysis.”). Of course, in practice many courts
have required much less of defendants. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 59
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (explaining that “the monopolist may proffer a ‘procompetitive justification’ for its
conduct. . . If the monopolist asserts a procompetitive justification — a nonpretextual claim that its
conduct is indeed a form of competition on the merits because it involves, for example, greater
efficiency or enhanced consumer appeal — then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to rebut that
claim”) (emphasis added).
192
Cf. Gavil & Salop, supra note 193; see also Daniel Francis, Making Sense of Monopolization, 84
ANTITRUST L.J. (forthcoming 2022).
193
This issue touches an important controversy in the law of evidence regarding the structure of a
showing required to rebut a presumption. See generally Ernest F. Roberts, An Introduction to the Study
of Presumptions, 4 VILL. L. REV. 1, 15–21 (1958) (comparing Thayerian view, pursuant to which a
presumption has no further operation after the introduction of evidence tending to rebut it, with its
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discharged its own burden through mere identification, circumstantial
evidence, tenuous inferences, or recourse to a formalistic legal presumption,
the defendant’s obligation should be proportionately lessened.
This is broadly consistent with the approach in merger cases. In cases where
the plaintiff provides evidence of anticompetitive harms, courts tend to
scrutinize purported justifications with skepticism and caution. 194 For
example, the D.C. Circuit in Baker Hughes on the one hand emphasized that
defendants should not be forced to rebut a “probability with a certainty,” 195
while on the other hand requiring the production of actual evidence of
efficiency benefits, not merely the identification of possible benefits. 196
Consistent with our approach, the court adopted a sliding scale, noting that
“[t]he more compelling the prima facie case, the more evidence the
defendant must present to rebut it successfully.” 197 This production burden,
of course, does not change the plaintiff’s ultimate burden of persuading the
court that a violation of law has occurred.
Thus, we disagree with the language the D.C. Circuit used in Microsoft
when it superficially appeared to suggest that if a defendant monopolist
merely “asserts” a non-pretextual procompetitive justification, that should
be sufficient to shift a burden back to the plaintiff. 198 If taken literally—as,
surely, the Microsoft court did not intend—that approach would force the
plaintiff to prove a negative by disproving the possibility that the asserted
benefit may be sufficient in magnitude to offset the harms and thereby
artificially raise the plaintiff’s burden of proof. 199 “Assertion” does not
require evidence. But that literal interpretation should be rejected: it is
unreasonable and inefficient to force the plaintiff to shoulder the burden of
elaborating and quantifying a defense based on an improvement in the
leading alternative—today sometimes known as the Morgan-McCormick view—which imposes a
burden of persuasion on the rebutting party). See also Steven C. Salop, An Enquiry Meet for the Case:
Decision Theory, Presumptions, and Evidentiary Burdens in in Formulating Antitrust Legal Standards
33–34
(Nov.
6,
2017)
(unpublished
manuscript)
(on
file
with
author
at
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/2007/).
194
See, e.g., United States v. Anthem, Inc., 855 F.3d 345 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (scrutinizing closely
defendants’ proffered efficiencies); FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1089–1090 (D.D.C. 1997)
(same).
195
See United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
196
Id. (“The burden of producing evidence to rebut this presumption then shifts to the defendant.”)
(emphasis added).
197
Id. at 991. See also, e.g., FTC v. CCC Holdings Inc., 605 F.Supp.2d 26, 46–47 (D.D.C. 2009).
198
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2001). See also Francis, supra note
201.
199
The court’s own analysis of the code-commingling allegation suggests a more meaningful
evidentiary burden on the defendant. See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 66–67 (noting that Microsoft “neither
specifies nor substantiates” claimed benefits from commingling of Internet Explorer’s code with
Windows).
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efficiency of the defendant’s business. Plaintiffs invariably have less access
to the relevant information, so such a rule also violates principles of
efficient decision-rule design.200
If the defendant satisfies its burden of showing that the benefits of
conduct outweigh the harms, then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to
rebut the defendant’s conclusion or prove that a significantly less restrictive
alternative is available, as explained in Alston.201
4. The Ultimate Rule of Decision
In accordance with these conditions—causal connection, correct allocation
of the burdens of proof, and symmetry—relaxing the general rule against
multi-market balancing can be a principled and helpful approach in an
appropriate set of platform cases.202
This still leaves the fundamental question of how to aggregate and weigh
these effects. Courts and agencies have several options, reflecting different
approaches to relative harms, benefits, and costs (including error costs), 203
whether in platform cases or in other cases involving harms to some
consumers and benefits to others:
(1) a pure Pareto-based “no consumer harmed” standard that would not
permit harm to any individual consumer;
(2) a “no group harmed” standard that would not permit net-harm to any
well defined groups of consumers;
200

This also applies in the context of Section 2, see Francis, supra note 201. Andrew I. Gavil & Steven
C. Salop, Probability, Presumptions and Evidentiary Burdens in Antitrust Analysis: Revitalizing the
Rule of Reason for Exclusionary Conduct, 168 U. PENN. L. REV. 2107 (2020)l; Bruce L. Hay & Kathryn
E. Spier, Burdens of Proof in Civil Litigation: An Economic Perspective, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 413 (1997);
C. Frederick Beckner III & Steven C. Salop, Decision Theory and Antitrust Rules, 67 A NTITRUST L.J.
41–76 (1999).
201
Alston, 594 U.S. __ (slip op. at 24-25). See also Viamedia, Inc. v. Comcast Corp., 951 F.3d 429,
488 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Microsoft for the proposition that a defendant bears the burden of “proving
procompetitive justification”); New York v. Actavis, PLC, Case No. 14-Civ-7473, 2014 WL 7015198
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2014) (citing Microsoft for the proposition that “the procompetitive benefits of the
business justification must outweigh the anticompetitive effects”).
202
We note the question—beyond the scope of this article—of whether and when this balancing rule
should be applied outside of the platform context. We also acknowledge that applying special rules to
a subset of cases will affect parties’ incentives to attempt to plead into or out of that subset. (This is, of
course, a consequence of Amex itself.)
203
For an overview of the application of decision theory to antitrust rules, see Steven C. Salop, An
Enquiry Meet for the Case: Decision Theory, Presumptions, and Evidentiary Burdens in in
Formulating Antitrust Legal Standards 33–34 (Nov. 6, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author at https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/2007/). See also Andrew I. Gavil & Steven C.
Salop, Probability, Presumptions and Evidentiary Burdens in Antitrust Analysis: Revitalizing the Rule
of Reason for Exclusionary Conduct, 168 U. PENN. L. REV. 2107 (2020); see generally Isaac Erlich &
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. Legal Stud. 257 (1974).
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(3) a “no side harmed” approach that would condemn a practice or
transaction whenever it was net-harmful to consumers on any one side
of a platform, even if there were greater benefits to consumers on other
sides;
(4) a “neutral weighing” approach that would allow harm to some
consumers to be justified by redeeming benefits to others, if the benefits
were sufficient in magnitude to fully offset the harms (i.e., without
weighting);
(5) a “harm-weighted” standard that gives greater weight to the interests of
consumers who are harmed overall and thus requires a more compelling
showing of offsetting benefits; and
(6) a “benefit-weighted” standard that gives greater weight to the interests
of consumers who are benefited overall, and thus requires a more
compelling showing of offsetting harms.

There is more to say about these options than there is space here and we
acknowledge the need for further work on the normative and technical
aspects of antitrust balancing.204 Option 1 would effectively prohibit
virtually any conduct within the scope of the rule, reflecting the wellknown impracticality of the Pareto criterion in the real world. 205 Option 2
shares much DNA with antitrust’s traditional price-discrimination market
approach, and it is likely to condemn most restraints in platform
environments.206 Option 3 resembles the traditional, separate-markets
approach in Philadelphia National Bank that entirely rejects crossplatform balancing.207 Option 4 offers the promise of keeping platform
antitrust focused on overall effects in affected markets, albeit at the cost
of tolerating harm to individual consumer groups.
Options 5 and 6 place “thumbs on the scale” in favor of consumers harmed
or benefited respectively. Option 5 weights more highly those consumers
who are harmed by the restraint, effectively prioritizing their protection
from economic harm over access to economic benefits by others. 208 Option
6 reflects an analogous anti-intervention view.209 Note that, at least in
204

For one very helpful contribution, see, e.g., Rebecca Haw Allensworth, The Commensurability Myth
in Antitrust, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2016).
205
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY § 2.3c (6th ed. 2020).
206
See Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 3.
207
Katz & Sallet, supra note 141, at 2158; see also Philadelphia Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 363.
208
Compare Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 10 n.14 (“Inextricably linked efficiencies are most likely
to make a difference when they are great and the likely anticompetitive effect in the relevant market(s)
is small so the merger is likely to benefit customers overall.”). In principle, a protected group might be
based on grounds such as income level or other vulnerability. Cf. Jonathan B. Baker & Steven C. Salop,
Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Inequality, 104 GEO. L.J. 1, 24–26 (2015). This might be justified,
for example, by reference to the diminishing marginal utility of wealth. See generally, e.g., Daniel
Crane, Antitrust and Wealth Inequality, 101 Cornell L. Rev. 1171 (2016).
209
See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1984).
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principle, there are at least two obvious ways in which one could place such
a thumb on the scale: the first would be to apply a “discount rate” to the
magnitude of one or other type of effect while conducting the balancing; the
second would be to require more cogent proof of one or other type of effect
before it can be held cognizable.
Even these options likely do not exhaust the possibilities. There may not be
consensus about the “correct” balancing standard. But the need to choose
one is inescapable, and that choice should be made openly rather than
hiding the ball, as the Amex Court did.
III. APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK: AMEX AS IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN
In Part II, we examined the Amex Court’s central errors of principle and we
set out a framework for the appraisal of rule-of-reason cases in platform
markets. In this Part, we apply that framework to the record in Amex itself.
Our analysis is structured to conform with familiar rule of reason burden
shifting. First, we consider the theoretical and evidentiary basis of harm to
competition in Amex. Next, we consider American Express’s evidence of
procompetitive justification, applying our proposed “platform exception” to
the general rule against multi-market balancing. Finally, we consider how
the ledger of effects might have been compared and balanced, showing that
on almost any plausible view—including most of the metrics discussed in
Part II—the record compelled a finding for the plaintiffs.
A. Harm to Competition
In the first stage of rule-of-reason analysis, a plaintiff must provide direct or
indirect prima facie evidence of a substantial anticompetitive effect. 210 In
practice, the vast majority of litigated Section 1 civil antitrust suits fail at
this stage.211 As a result, the case law is particularly well developed on the
methods a plaintiff may use to show harm to competition, including adverse
impacts on price, output, quality, innovation, and other indicia of
competition.212

210

See Alston, 594 U.S. at _ (slip op. at 24-25).
Michael Carrier has calculated that between 1999 and 2009, “[c]ourts dispose[d] of 97% of cases at
the first stage, on the grounds that there is no anticompetitive effect,” and “balance[d] in only 2% of
cases.” Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update for the 21st Century, 16 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 827, 828 (2009); see also Michael A. Carrier, The Real Rule of Reason: Bridging the
Disconnect, 1999 BYU L. REV. 1265 (1999).
212
This is consistent with the kind of evidence that has successfully discharged the plaintiff’s burden
in rule-of-reason cases in other industries. In NCAA v. Board of Regents, for example, the Supreme
211
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The Amex record contained plentiful evidence of anticompetitive effects. In
particular, the plaintiffs had shown that:







American Express had “repeatedly and profitably raised its [merchant
fees] to millions of merchants across the United States . . . without losing a
single large merchant and losing relatively few small merchants as a
result”;213
the antisteering rules had created or contributed to a pricing umbrella,
allowing Visa and MasterCard to raise their own fees with “virtual
impunity”;214
in addition to effects on merchants, these merchant fee increases “were not
paired with offsetting adjustments on the cardholder side of the platform,”
and as such were “properly viewed as changes to the net price charged
across Amex’s integrated platform”;215 and
all consumers—including American Express cardholders and other
cardholders, and non-cardholders who purchased from merchants who
accepted credit cards—paid higher merchandise prices as a result of the
rules, regardless of whether they were receiving card benefits.216

Under the approach we outlined in Part II, it would have been sufficient for
the plaintiffs to have furnished evidence of harm in a single market on one
side of the platform, such as the market for credit card services to
merchants. In this analysis, the merchants are the direct participants on their
Court held that a plaintiff had satisfied its initial burden by showing both limitations of output, in the
form of a ceiling on the number of televised sports games, and price increases arising from a loss of
price competition among member schools. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 113. Likewise, in Realcomp
II, Ltd. v. FTC, 635 F.3d 815 (6th Cir. 2011), the Sixth Circuit affirmed a finding that a restraint had
suppressed competition for certain real estate services, based on a record that included evidence that
the restraint was correlated with a statistically significant decrease in a low-cost form of competition.
See Realcomp II, 635 F.3d 833-34. In Graphics Products Distributors v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560
(11th Cir. 1983), the Eleventh Circuit found that the challenged restraints had eliminated competition
and that they threatened “substantially adverse effects on price competition and consumer welfare,”
based on testimony that the excluded competition would have been qualitatively significant and
evidence of a substantial price increase as a result of the restrictions. Itek, 717 F.2d at 1575. In L.A.
Memorial Coliseum v. Nat’l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984), the Ninth Circuit held
that competitive harms were “plain” when the challenged restrictions insulated [NFL] teams from
competition and “allow[ed] them to set monopoly prices to the detriment of the consuming public.”
L.A. Memorial Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1395. In Roseborough Monument Co. v. Memorial Park
Cemetery, 666 F.2d 1130 (8th Cir. 1981), the Eighth Circuit held that anticompetitive effects were
“obvious” from a horizontal arrangement among cemeteries that reserved foundation preparation
services at each cemetery to the cemetery itself, excluding other cemeteries and independent operators
from competing for the work, even when they could perform “the same . . . service at a lower price.”
666 F.2d at 1139–40.
213
Id. at 195.
214
Id. at 202; see also id. at 216 (“Visa and MasterCard, for instance, were able to increase their average
all-in merchant rates through a variety of means by more than 20% from 1997 to 2009, without fear of
other networks undercutting their prices in order to gain share.”).
215
Id. at 196.
216
Id. at 150; see also id. at 208.
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side of the platform and are considered consumers in the relevant sense: the
effects on their welfare includes the effects passed on to consumers who do
not pay with credit cards.
The evidence in the record also supported overall harm, not just harm to
merchants. Merchants, most cardholders, and non-cardholding consumers
were all harmed by the restraints, at least before considering any separate
potential benefits like a “credentialing” or “welcome acceptance” effect. 217
As Justice Breyer’s dissent correctly noted, the District Court’s factual
findings on these net effects—particularly the finding that harms to
merchants were not in fact offset by effects on cardholders—were
“unchallenged.”218
This direct evidence of anticompetitive effects was buttressed by the nature
of the restraint. An antisteering rule amounts to a “retail price most favored
nation” agreement (“MFN”): that is, an agreement that prohibits a retailer
from treating other suppliers more favorably than it treats the supplier
imposing the rule.219 Economic theory teaches that such agreements can
have the effect of softening interbrand price competition at the point of sale
and of encouraging competitors to increase or maintain their own fees,
rather than reduce them.220 Indeed, a central effect of the American Express
rule here was to ensure that a reduction in Visa’s or Mastercard’s fees
would not result in merchant steering away from American Express to Visa
or Mastercard, thereby eroding the incentive for those other cards to
compete aggressively with American Express on price. 221 In addition,
American Express furnished no reason to expect competitive benefits often
claimed for MFNs, such as transaction cost savings from negotiating price
discounts.222

217

See 88 F. Supp. 3d at 216–17 (discussing “the cost of the premium rewards conferred by American
Express on its relatively small, affluent cardholder base in the form of higher retail prices”).
218
138 S. Ct. at 2301–02 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
219
This interbrand restraint was similar to the restraint that was condemned in the Apple e-books case.
See United States v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
220
Dennis W. Carlton & Ralph A. Winter, Vertical MFN’s and the Credit Card No-Surcharge Rule,
61 J.L. & ECON. 215 (2018); Jonathan B. Baker & Fiona Scott Morton, Antitrust Enforcement Against
Platform MFNs, 127 YALE L. J. (2018).
221
The District Court made this finding. However, the Supreme Court, without overruling the District
Court’s finding and without any support for its assertion, insisted that Visa and MasterCard retained
incentives to compete on price in the face of the restraints. 138 S. Ct. at 2290 (stating that “antisteering
provisions do not prevent Visa, MasterCard, or Discover from competing against Amex by offering
lower merchant fees or promoting their broader merchant acceptance”).
222
11 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1807 (4th ed. 2018). An
analogous intrabrand MFN would involve a contractual promise by Amex to charge the same merchant
fee to all retailers.
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1. The Neglected Parallelism of Antisteering
Neither the various courts in the Amex litigation, nor the plaintiffs, focused
on an important dimension of the economics of antisteering: the interactions
between the effects of American Express’s antisteering rules and effects of
the parallel antisteering rules of Visa and MasterCard. 223 The Court ignored
the fact that, during most of the period under analysis, all three networks
had antisteering rules. In addition, the Court did not appear to consider that
American Express’s rule also contributed to Visa’s and Mastercard’s ability
and incentives to increase their own fees during this period and prevented
competitive strategies based on low merchant fees. 224
Although American Express was the lone defendant at trial, and despite
careful emphasis in the complaint that each rule alone was
anticompetitive,225 both theory and evidence suggest the effects of the
antisteering restrictions implemented earlier by American Express, Visa,
and Mastercard were mutually reinforcing. 226 That is, each company had a
better ability and incentive to set supracompetitive fees because the other
two major credit cards also imposed antisteering rules during the relevant
period.
The economic analysis is straightforward. Visa’s antisteering rule
eliminated the incentive of MasterCard and American Express to cut their
merchant fees but did not eliminate Visa’s incentive to do so. However, the
American Express antisteering rule perfected the anticompetitive effect by
eliminating Visa’s and MasterCard’s incentives to cut their fees. At the
same time, each of the rules increased the unilateral incentive of the
network imposing it to raise its fees, because it gives the network
confidence that the merchant would be unable to steer consumers to the

223

In its recent decision affirming dismissal of damages claims against American Express by a class of
non-Amex accepting merchants, the Second Circuit pointed to “uncertainty of how eliminating Amex’s
Anti-Steering Rules would affect its competitors’ merchant fees,” while nevertheless acknowledging
that the District Court found Amex’s antisteering rules “enabled Visa and MasterCard to ‘increase their
average all-in merchant rates . . . by more than 20% . . . without fear of other networks undercutting
their prices in order to gain [market] share,’” and the Supreme Court “did not question this finding.”
Opinion at 19 n.8, In re American Express Anti-Steering Rules Antitrust Litigation, No. 20-1766 (Nov.
22, 2021).
224
88 F. Supp. 3d. at 201–02; see also Discover Brief Amicus Curiae, *7.
225
Amended Complaint for Equitable Relief at ¶ 23, United States v. Am. Express Co., No. CV-104496 (NGG)(RER) (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2010) (“Each Defendant’s set of vertically imposed restrictions
independently restrains competition among networks. Each Defendant’s Merchant Restraints violate
Section 1 of the Sherman Act apart from the existence of the other two Defendants’ Merchant
Restrictions.”).
226
For a general discussion of the consequences of parallel vertical restraints, see generally C. Scott
Hemphill & Tim Wu, Parallel Exclusion, 122 Yale L.J. 1182 (2013).
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other networks.227 Yet, while the Court said, “the cause of increased
merchant fees is not Amex’s antisteering provisions, but rather increased
competition for cardholders,”228 the Court ignored the obvious role of
antisteering rules in driving fees up and keeping them high. In this regard,
the Court also ignored evidence suggesting that the antisteering rules were
the cause of the failure of Discover’s competitive strategy of offering lower
merchant fees.229
As in many cases involving vertical restraints in an oligopolistic market, the
compounding effects of parallel restraints are intuitively plausible and a
ground for increased competitive concern. Indeed, the Leegin Court
acknowledged that even intrabrand vertical restraints “should be subject to
more careful scrutiny . . . if many competing manufacturers adopt the
practice.”230 Moreover, the credit card market was highly concentrated.
Calculating shares based on the dollar value of transactions, American
Express’s market share was 26% in this highly concentrated market, where
Visa had a 47% share and MasterCard had a 23% share. 231 Accordingly, the
market was prone to oligopoly effects, and American Express’s retail
interbrand MFN was well placed to lead or support parallel practices by the
other two oligopolists.
To be clear, we do not suggest that there was an express agreement among
the three credit card networks to institute or maintain antisteering rules. If
there had been evidence of such naked collusion, per se illegality would
have been the likely result.232 Nor do we suggest that consciously parallel
conduct is unlawful.233 Rather, our point is that the contribution of the
antisteering rule to price increases by its competitors should have been
reflected in the Court’s analysis of the effects of that rule. It is a truism of
rule of reason case law that the effects of restrictive practices must be
assessed in light of their distinctive circumstances. 234 When a restrictive
227

This impact is subject to the ability of consumers to switch to non-credit card alternatives, such as
cash or debit cards. However, both the credit facility and convenience drive consumer preference for
credit card usage.
228
138 S. Ct. at 2288.
229
Discover Brief Amicus Curiae at *8.
230
Leegin, 551 U.S. at 898.
231
88 F. Supp. 3d at 188.
232
In fact, when Visa and Mastercard adopted their no-surcharge rules and other rules requiring all
issuers to be treated the same, the two networks had a governance scheme that permitted member banks
to “have formal decision-making authority in one system while issuing a significant percentage of its
credit and charge cards on a rival system.” Visa U, 163 F. Supp. 2d at 328 (internal quotations omitted).
233
See Theatre Enterprises v. Paramount Distributing, 346 U.S. 537, 541 (1954).
234
See Alston, 594 U.S. at _ (slip op. at 16) (describing rule-of-reason analysis as a “fact-specific
assessment of market power and market structure aimed at assessing the challenged restraint’s actual
effect on competition—especially its capacity to reduce output and increase price”) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
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practice significantly increases the ability and incentive of other competing
firms to raise prices or to impose or maintain similar restraints, such
competitor responses should be included in the assessment of competitive
effects.235
The Court appeared entirely blind to this concern, and even misinterpreted
fee increases by Visa and Mastercard as evidence in American Express’s
favor:
In addition, the evidence that does exist cuts against the plaintiffs’ view
that Amex’s antisteering provisions are the cause of any increases in
merchant fees. Visa and MasterCard’s merchant fees have continued to
increase, even at merchant locations where Amex is not accepted and,
thus, Amex’s antisteering provisions do not apply. . . . This suggests that
the cause of increased merchant fees is not Amex’s antisteering
provisions, but rather increased competition for cardholders and a
corresponding marketwide adjustment in the relative price charged to
merchants.236

The relevant passage is remarkable in its lack of attention to the
pernicious tendency of parallel antisteering rules. As we explain
next, the Court’s focus on output over price effects further
demonstrates its misunderstanding of the compounding
anticompetitive effects of American Express’ antisteering rules.
2. The Prisoner’s Dilemma and Its Effect on Output
If consumers were harmed by the antisteering rules, as the District Court
concluded, why didn’t the consumers choose to pay with debit cards, cash
or checks?
One explanation is that the credit card antisteering rules contributed to a
collective action problem among consumers, amounting to a Prisoner’s
Dilemma. The causal sequence is as follows: first, by charging a higher
merchant fee, a credit card network can provide greater rewards to card
users; second, the higher merchant fee combined with the antisteering rule
causes merchants to raise merchandise prices across the board, rather than
235

See U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Indiana Gas Co., Inc. 350 F.3d 623, 627 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[A] cartel cuts
output, which elevates price throughout the market; customers of fringe firms (sellers that have not
joined the cartel) pay this higher price, and thus suffer antitrust injury, just like customers of the cartel
members.”).
236
138 S. Ct. at 2288 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Despite the 2010 Visa and Mastercard
consent decrees, the American Express antisteering rules prevented them from steering at stores where
American Express was accepted. Their normal uniform policies would have made it difficult for the
merchant to engage in steering policies only at the minority of predominately small stores where
American Express was not accepted.
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surcharging transactions made with the higher fee card; third, as a result,
each individual consumer has a greater incentive to use credit cards more
intensively to benefit from its rewards—increasing the fee burden on
merchants still further and driving the cycle again; fourth, as more
consumers use credit cards, merchandise prices paid by all consumers are
increased further.
This is a classic Prisoner’s Dilemma, that is, a situation in which each
participant’s unilateral pursuit of its own best interests leads to an outcome
that is worse overall for all the participants. From the individual consumer’s
perspective, the benefit of the rewards offsets the harm from the de minimis
marginal increase in merchandise prices caused by that single individual’s
decision to use the card, so it is individually rational to use the card. Other
consumers do the same, forcing merchandise prices further upward. Since
merchandise prices are going to be elevated anyway, it is better to enjoy
rewards than not to do so. However, like other Prisoner’s Dilemmas, the
mere fact that an individually rational consumer would choose to use a card
in a world of antisteering does not mean that cardholding consumers
collectively would be better off from doing so than they would be absent the
restraint.237 In fact, most consumers may be collectively worse off from the
increased card usage.238
Of course, the real world is more complicated. The wealthiest consumers
who obtain the largest rewards may benefit on balance from rewards that
exceed the increase in merchandise prices. Others who receive smaller
rewards or consumers who do not use credit cards—likely less wealthy

237

See also John M. Newman, The Output-Welfare Fallacy: A Modern Antitrust Paradox, 107 IOWA
L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (noting the dilemma).
238
To illustrate with a stylized numerical example, suppose that all consumers used credit cards in
equal amounts. Using cards gives each consumer $1.50 in transactional benefits from a $100 purchase,
relative to cash or checks. Suppose further that the credit cards charge merchants $3 and offer user
rewards of $1. Assuming that merchants fully pass on the fees as higher merchandise prices,
cardholders will pay $3 more in total in increased merchandise prices while reaping rewards of only
$1. Assuming for simplicity that the additional costs of operating the rewards program are zero, the
card networks face $1 in reward costs with the rest spent on advertising or retained as profits. In this
situation, the net consumer welfare impact on the $100 purchase is a harm of $0.50 (i.e., $3 price
increase, offset by $1 in rewards and $1.50 in transactional benefit). Yet the Prisoner’s Dilemma
dynamics give every consumer the individual incentive to use the cards to get the $2.50 benefit, rather
than face the same increased merchandise prices without the shelter of rewards or transactional benefits.
At the same time, the consumers would be better off if instead the cards charged merchants $1, and
were not permitted to offer rewards, in which case net consumer welfare would be positive $0.50 (i.e.,
$1.50 minus $1). Note that in practice these effects would be mitigated at least to some extent by the
Durbin Amendment’s protection of the right to offer discounts for cash payment. See generally Tamás
Briglevics & Oz Shy, Why Don’t Most Merchants Use Price Discounts to Steer Consumer Payment
Choice?, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Public Pol’y Discussion Paper 12-9 (2012).
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consumers—are harmed.239 Note that those consumers who do not use
credit cards are not considered direct participants in the relevant market for
credit card services to cardholders. However, their harm—which is
essentially a passed-on overcharge plus a deadweight loss from the higher
prices—is included in and derivative of the harm to merchants, who are
participants in the relevant market for card acceptance services to
merchants. Merchants themselves face further harm because even if
merchants can fully pass on merchant fees as higher merchandise prices,
they will sell less merchandise at those higher prices.
This Prisoner’s Dilemma underpins another important error made by the
Supreme Court, which future courts should be careful to avoid. The District
Court had found that increased prices—specifically higher merchant fees
and higher merchandise prices for most consumers (even taking into
account cardholder rewards)—was evidence of anticompetitive harm. The
Supreme Court rejected this evidence as insufficient and focused instead on
output, explaining that volume of credit card transactions increased. But the
Court failed to spot the fallacy here. The Prisoner’s Dilemma creates
incentives that tend to increase the number and dollar value of credit card
transactions above the efficient competitive level at the expense of other
forms of payment.240 The higher prices increased the dollar value of
transactions. Thus, looking only at the dollar value of credit card
transactions in isolation, calling it “output,” and denying competitive
concerns because that measure is increasing, amounts to another error. 241
This point can be discerned in the states’ briefing,242 though it appeared
completely lost on the Court.

239

See 88 F. Supp. 3d at 217 (citing Adam J. Levitin, Priceless? The Economic Costs of Credit Card
Merchant Restraints, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1321, 1356 (2008) (noting regressivity of cross-subsidy)).
240
This basic dynamic is familiar from other situations in which the costs of a practice are externalized
to others: overproduction of pollution is a classic example. See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating
Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-To-The-Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental
Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1212 (1992).
241
This is in addition to the Court’s other separate (and familiar) error of assuming that, if output is
rising or price is falling, competitive concerns are improbable. The fallacy here lies in the use of the
wrong counterfactual: if output would have been rising faster, or by a greater amount, but-for the
challenged conduct, then in the relevant sense there is an output reduction, even if output is increasing
in an absolute sense. See, e.g.,138 S. Ct. at 2289 (dismissing the tendency of the restrictions to stifle
competition because, among other things, “while these agreements have been in place, the credit-card
market experienced expanding output and improved quality.”).
242
Brief for Petitioners at 47, Ohio v. Am. Express Co, 138 S. Ct. 2274 (No. 16-1454); see also, e.g.,
John Newman, The Output-Welfare Fallacy: A Modern Antitrust Paradox, 107 Iowa L. Rev. 563
(2022).
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B. Cognizable Procompetitive Justifications: Distinguishing Efficiency
Benefits from Extracted Rents
The Amex Court appears to have misinterpreted some harms as
procompetitive benefits by assuming that the provision of any cardholder
reward was, by definition, a procompetitive benefit.243 But at least some of
the cardholder benefits might be more accurately thought of as rent
extraction orchestrated by American Express, in a manner analogous to
buyer coordination, and externalized onto other consumers. This same issue
also can arise in other platform antitrust cases.
To illustrate, consider a hypothetical in which a group of wealthy
consumers band together and offer merchants the following terms:
“Because we collectively represent a significant chunk of your most
valuable consumer traffic, we jointly threaten not to shop at your stores
unless you accept our use of payment cards that pay us large ‘transaction
fees,’ which you can fund by a general increase in your merchandise prices
you charge to other consumers.” 244
In this somewhat extreme hypothetical, the wealthy consumer group is
functioning as a buyer group, but without any of the procompetitive benefits
that may result from and can sometimes justify coordinated or joint
purchasing. The group has engaged in no procompetitive economic
integration and has not created any economies of scale in purchasing. 245 In
economic terms, this hypothetical group is a type of buyer cartel. In effect,
the merchants’ costs (and the prices paid by other consumers) have been
driven up by the imposition of a cartel overcharge, and the wealthy
participants pocket the surplus. Under most plausible conditions, the
welfare of the merchants and all the other consumers will decline as a result.
And if this buyer cartel is organized by an agent that extracts some of the
fees for itself as margin, then the proportion of the cartel rent that reaches
the wealthy consumers in the group will decline somewhat, increasing
overall consumer harm even further.
This hypothetical illustrates how cardholder “rewards” extracted from
merchants by jointly acting consumers and funded by a general increase in
merchandise pricing may, at least to some extent, be seen to represent
anticompetitive rent extraction through collective action rather than the
243

See, e.g., 138 S. Ct. at 2289–90 (treating investment in rewards as unambiguously procompetitive).
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fruits of procompetitive efficiencies. Indeed, in the hypothetical, there are
no procompetitive efficiencies at all. The practice does not reduce
transaction costs, and no joint-purchasing efficiency benefits are generated.
The “rewards” for the participants are the rent extraction fruits of pure
buyer collusion.
The Court’s procompetitive explanation was that American Express’s
increased merchant fees “reflect increases in the value of its services and the
cost of its transactions, not an ability to charge above a competitive
price.”246 But, in light of the hypothetical, a better characterization for at
least some of the increment may be that the “value of its services” includes
the fruits of higher fees—above the competitive level—extracted from
merchants. On this view, “welcome acceptance” could be considered a
euphemism for the desired rent-extraction mechanism.247 The record in
Amex showed that American Express cardholders were among the
merchants’ most valuable consumers, which increased the risk to a
merchant of these consumers turning elsewhere if the merchant chose not to
accept American Express.248 Economically, each merchant could be
understood as facing a potential boycott by a group of its highest-value
customers.
We are not suggesting that American Express or other credit card networks
are naked buyer cartels. Credit cards make paying for goods and services
much easier, provide important payment services to merchants, and offer
valuable revolving credit to cardholders. Nor are we suggesting that all
cardholder benefits are invariably or even predominantly improper. Rather,
cardholder rewards should not be assumed to be, dollar for dollar, evidence
of a procompetitive benefit. They may represent a combination of both
procompetitive benefits and mere extracted rents.249 A full and fair
assessment of the effects in Amex would have taken this dynamic seriously,
aimed to measure its significance, and reflected it in measuring the nature
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Herbert Hovenkamp makes a similar point. Herbert Hovenkamp, Platforms and the Rule of Reason:
The American Express Case, 2019 COLUMBIA BUS. L. REV. 35, 66–67 (2019) (‘Welcome acceptance’
in this case apparently meant that the buyer should be prevented from being offered or even told about
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138 S. Ct. at 2281.
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Compare, e.g., John M. Newman, Antitrust in Zero-Price Markets: Applications, 94 Wash. U. L.
Rev. 49, 80–81 (2016) (pointing out that “[i]t is an ancient tenet of the law that disposing of ill-gotten
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and magnitude of any procompetitive benefits. Future courts should avoid
repeating this error.250
C. Conducting the Balancing
In Amex, there was ample evidence that the antisteering rules, along
with Visa and MasterCard's parallel restraints, drove up merchant fees,
inflated merchandise prices for cardholding and non-cardholding
consumers, and fueled a destructive Prisoner’s Dilemma that harmed most
merchants and their customers. At the same time, the evidence of
substantial, genuinely procompetitive benefits sufficient to exceed the
harms was weak, particularly since American Express and the other card
networks extracted some of the higher merchant fees.251 Given the
weakness of American Express’s evidence of cardholder benefits, we doubt
that it would have been necessary to conduct a weighing in Amex itself. But,
in the interests of clarifying a framework for future cases, we outline that
analysis here.
The District Court concluded that most of American Express’s proposed
procompetitive benefits were either theoretically flawed or not backed up by
evidence. However, to illustrate the proposed analysis, we consider one of
the arguments that at least has the virtue of being legally cognizable: the
claim that American Express had made investments in its brand that exerted
a “halo” or “credentialing” effect on merchants that accepted the card and
drove consumer traffic to them.252
Suppose that American Express had produced evidence that merchants
derived a benefit of increased customer traffic and purchases by merely
advertising acceptance of the card, and that this served as a signal of
prestige. Suppose that it also produced evidence that these benefits were
caused by American Express’s investments in advertising, quality of
service, and in screening for reputable merchants. Assume further that there
were reasonable grounds to believe that merchants would have the incentive
to free ride on Amex’s efforts by violating its “welcome acceptance” policy
and redirecting the customers who were influenced by this signal to use
250

Similar dynamics could present themselves in the context of MFN-plus agreements, in which a
purchaser secures a “discount” against the terms offered by a counterparty to others, funded by a
general increase in the prices charged by the counterparty. See, e.g., Complaint, United States v. Blue
Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, No. 2:10-cv-15155-DPH-MKM (E.D. Mich. Oct. 18, 2010); cf. Kartell
v. Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir. 1984); North Jackson Pharmacy, Inc. v. Caremark
RX, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 2d 740 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
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See supra Section I.B.
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another, lower cost payment method. Finally, assume that American
Express could show that the antisteering rules eliminated this opportunity
for merchant free riding and thereby encouraged it to further invest in this
credentialing effect.
If American Express could show all this, the balancing step would require
finding that the anticompetitive harms proven by the plaintiff as a result of
the higher fees were fully offset by the incremental beneficial effects on
investment under the antisteering rules, compared to the investment that
would take place without such rules. While the language of magnitudes and
offsets suggests the tidiness of a simple equation, this determination would
depend on the balancing standard applied by the court.
The Court treated the relevant harms, for the purposes of balancing, as
including only the increased fees paid by merchants. 253 But this misses at
least two sets of harms which ought to have been included, consistent with
the symmetry principle described in Part II: (1) deadweight losses that result
from unsatisfied customer demand in response to higher merchandise
prices254; and (2) the incremental effects of American Express’s antisteering
rules on the merchant fees charged by other card networks. 255 It also ignores
the innovation harms identified by the District Court. 256
On a full accounting, it is likely that American Express would have failed to
carry its burden under most of the alternative standards set out in Part II. It
obviously would fail under the “no consumer harmed” standard and the nogroup harmed standard, because of the clear harms to the individuals who
do not pay with credit cards, to those who do not pay with American
Express credit cards, or to those who do not qualify for rewards. American
Express would fail under the “no side harmed” standard because the
increase in the merchant fees lead to higher merchandise prices that directly
harm purchasers and the merchants. It also would surely fail under the
“harm-weighted” standard, given the weakness of benefit evidence.
It is theoretically possible that American Express could have prevailed
under a “benefit-weighted” standard that favored defendants. But even that
seems highly unlikely given the record. 257 The District Court rejected the
253
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proffered evidence of procompetitive benefits at trial and found that the
Amex trailed its competitors in any “credentialling effect.” If the cardholder
rewards were cognizable as a procompetitive benefit (despite the Prisoners’
Dilemma discussed above), the balance still may not have come out in
Amex’s favor. The DOJ’s economic expert and the District Court concluded
that American Express passed on only a portion of the higher merchant fees
as rewards.258 And, finally, even if American Express had made its own
cardholders whole with rewards, and even if Visa and MasterCard issuers
did the same, there would still be larger harms on the merchant side
(including those passed on harms to the purchasers that did not use credit
cards).259 Significant pro-defendant weighting or huge other efficiencies
(such as a huge credentialing effect of a kind nowhere in the record) would
likely be needed to offset this effect. The rules would be even less likely to
survive the application of a harm-weighted standard.
As a result, under the kind of balancing framework that we commend to
future courts, the rules would not plausibly have passed muster.
IV.

MOVING ON FROM AMEX

In the preceding pages, we have described and applied our proposed
framework for the antitrust analysis of platform cases, taking Amex as our
foil but aiming for a sounder approach that can guide adjudication in future
cases. No doubt the framework will strike many as less than revolutionary.
We hope so. A key benefit of our approach is that it preserves as much of
the fabric of existing law as possible. The basic burden-shifting approach
under the rule of reason is readily adaptable to platforms with the principled
relaxation of the rule against multi-market balancing we propose.
The problem, of course, is what can be done about Amex itself. We suggest
three different options, offered to the three different entities who have the
power to act: the Supreme Court, lower courts, and Congress.
A. A Direct Fix for the Supreme Court: Overrule Amex
The ideal path would be for the Supreme Court to overrule Amex directly
and expressly embrace the analytical framework we propose for all cases,
258
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In the extreme, suppose that all the networks raised their merchant fees by the same amount, all
purchases were made with credit cards, and all the merchants fully passed-on the higher fees as higher
merchandise prices. In this case, if all consumers reckoned the higher rewards into their purchase
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including future transaction platform cases. This would involve correcting
its approach to market definition and repudiating the idea that a plaintiff
must disprove the possibility of offsetting benefits in a transaction platform
case. The Court should also eliminate the requirement of proving market
power by formally defining a market and gauging market share in vertical
restraint cases when there is direct evidence of market power or
anticompetitive effects.
In place of the approach taken by the Amex majority, the Court could adopt
instead the framework we describe in Part II. This approach preserves the
possibility of cross-platform balancing in appropriate platform cases while
still permitting direct evidence of market power and following the
substitutability principle when defining markets. To do so, the Court would
implement a narrow platform exception, allowing multi-market balancing
across multiple sides of a platform under the three limiting conditions
described above: (1) causal connection as the test for counting beneficial
effects on other sides of the platform; (2) correct allocation of the burdens
of proof (harms for plaintiffs, benefits for defendants); and (3) the
symmetry principle that harms and benefits on all sides of the platform must
be included to protect against cherry-picking that may give a court a
misleading picture of the balance of a measure’s effects.
The Court has often made substantial course corrections in its 130-year
exposition of the Sherman Act. Perhaps the most famous was the
overarching Section 1 rule of reason standard itself, created when Standard
Oil implicitly overruled Trans-Missouri Freight.260 Other dramatic reversals
have included the multiple revisions of the law of non-price intrabrand
vertical restraints,261 the law of minimum resale price maintenance, 262 the
law of maximum resale price maintenance,263 the market-power
presumption in patent cases,264 the predatory pricing standard, 265 and even
the constitutional reach of the Sherman Act itself.266 More generally, in both
260
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antitrust and non-antitrust cases, the Court has shown a pragmatic
willingness to correct what it views as errors when they are important
enough, when they are sufficiently clear, and when the threat of harm is
obvious.267
Those factors are amply satisfied here. Amex has already led directly to a
dead wrong decision in Sabre/Farelogix that would have led to immediate
consumer harm had the UK antitrust authority not intervened. 268 The courts
are drowning in arguments—from the arguable to the meritless—by
defendants hoping to avail themselves of the “Amex exceptions” to various
established points of antitrust orthodoxy from market definition to proof
burdens.269 A chorus of critical commentary should help the Court see that
this decision is not worth defending. 270 In the years since Amex was
decided, a panoply of antitrust litigation has been initiated against the socalled “Big Tech” platforms.271 These cases deserve pragmatic, careful
analysis. To the extent that Amex impedes such analysis, it is unjustified and
should be overruled.
B. A Cry for Congressional Help: Statutory Intervention
The second hope for a direct fix lies with the legislature. Although Congress
has historically been reluctant to micromanage antitrust doctrine (a policy
that we think generally wise), legislative willingness to revisit and modify
the antitrust laws seems to be at a generational peak. In that light, fixing
Amex should be near the top of Congress’s antitrust agenda. 272 While we do
267

When deciding whether to relax the general principle of stare decisis, the Court considers several
factors, with the goal of “gaug[ing] the respective costs of reaffirming and overruling a prior case.”
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not suggest that Congress should intervene to correct every bad precedent,
correction could be achieved here simply and by reaffirming wellrecognized antitrust principles.
The best solution turns on the fact—emphasized throughout Part II—that
the Court grounded its analysis in market definition. The single “two-sided”
transaction platform market definition allowed the Court to avoid the
express question of multi-market balancing and to characterize the record as
telling an incomplete story of harm to a transacting pair. Correcting the
market definition holding would: (1) restore the integrity of the market
definition substitution principle; (2) force future courts to explicitly tackle
the multi-market balancing question; and (3) ensure that future courts would
not be tempted to reconceive the possibility of out-of-market benefits as a
deficiency in a plaintiff’s showing of in-market harms.
To that end, we recommend that the Sherman Act be amended to read, in
relevant part:
In a case brought under the antitrust laws, any definition of a
relevant antitrust market shall be conducted by reference to the
principle of substitutability.
This provision shall not be construed to require the formal
definition of a relevant antitrust market in cases where such
definition would not otherwise be required, including cases where
competitive harm is shown by direct evidence.
This surgical legislative intervention would go further than CALERA by
protecting against the errors of Amex in merger cases as well as conduct
cases.273 Note also that we do not recommend specifying any particular
manifestation of the substitutability principle—nor even confining it to
demand-side substitution—as doing so would go beyond simply fixing
Amex and could needlessly interfere with the development of market
definition doctrine.

RECOMMENDATIONS 399 (Oct. 2020) (proposing “[o]verriding Ohio v. American Express by clarifying
that cases involving platforms do not require plaintiffs to establish harm to both sets of customers”).
273
Section 13 of the proposed legislation, which eliminates any strict market definition requirement
and reaffirms the direct-evidence standard, largely re-states existing law, although it corrects the bizarre
limitation introduced in Amex’s footnote 7. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. But Section
26A of the proposed legislation, which underscores that exclusionary conduct may violate the law even
if it does not harm competition on more than one side of a multisided platform, does not seem to correct
the Amex Court’s errors on either market definition or burdens of proof.
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C. A Stopgap Measure for Lower Courts: Keeping AmEx Within Bounds
Even if the Court or Congress chooses to overrule the unworkable
dimensions of Amex, that process may take time. In the meantime, the best
path for lower courts is to take the Amex opinion at its word and narrowly
construe its holdings. Both the market definition and effects analyses can
and should be understood as narrow, fact-bound conclusions.
Amex is limited on its face to transaction platforms that meet the following
conditions: (1) activity on both sides is strictly joint and simultaneous, (2)
relevant services are limited to the execution of transactions, and (3) such
platforms compete only with other multisided platforms. 274 Those
limitations should be taken seriously, as the Court directed, despite our
concerns about the economics of the categorization. 275 “Mixed” platforms—
offering transactional services as well as nontransactional services, such as
market-making services—should be subject to Amex only with respect to
the restraints on the provision of transactional services.
Many platforms provide both transactional and nontransactional services.
For example, ecommerce platforms and app stores commonly provide
nontransactional services (like search, curation, and information services) to
users and transactional services (like app purchases) to user-merchant or
user-developer pairs. Likewise, a ridesharing platform provides
nontransactional services (like search) to users and drivers separately, and
then transactional services (like ride monitoring and payment processing)
jointly and simultaneously to the user-driver pair after they have chosen to
trade. Amex should apply to such mixed platforms only to the extent that
they offer transactional services and the antitrust theory of harm pertains to
such services.276
There is some room for optimism. United States v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Hospital Authority demonstrates a district court’s ability to limit Amex to its
facts and properly apply the rule of reason in the face of a defendant’s
claims to special treatment by reason of platform status. In June 2016, the
274
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DOJ filed a complaint against Carolinas HealthCare System (“CHS”)
challenging anti-steering provisions in CHS’s contracts with commercial
health insurers.277 Following the Second Circuit’s Amex decision in
September 2016, CHS argued that its provisions mirrored those at issue in
the Amex case and that the Second Circuit’s analysis should guide the
analysis in this case.278 In a 2017 order, the Western District of North
Carolina rejected the argument, emphasizing the need for a traditional
market-specific analysis.279 The District Court explained that it was not
bound by the Second Circuit and concluded that the Second Circuit's
reasoning should be limited to credit card markets. 280 The parties settled
before Amex was decided by the Supreme Court, but the District Court’s
focus on the particular history and context of the market at issue would be
equally appropriate today.281
CONCLUSION
The last four years have taught us that the errors of Amex are every bit as
serious and harmful as commentators feared when it first came down. 282 In
the preceding pages, we outline a better approach: a path that restores
principle and vigor to platform antitrust while respecting the special nature
of certain platform businesses. We argue that the substitutability approach
to market definition should be restored in platform cases, and that
traditional allocations of burdens of proof must be preserved. And we
suggest a limited and principled rule for the cross-platform balancing of
harms and benefits.
We hope that the Supreme Court will swiftly correct its error at the first
opportunity. However, if it fails to do so, neither the lower courts nor
Congress are powerless. Lower courts can and should heed the many
limiting principles on the face of the Court’s own decision. And Congress
could undertake a scalpel-like intervention with confidence. Correct the
market-definition component, and the rest will likely work itself out.

277

Complaint, United States v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth., No. 3:16-cv-00311-RJC-DCK
(W.D.N.C. June 9, 2016), ECF No. 1.
278
Supplemental Briefing of Defendant on United States v. Am. Express, United States v. CharlotteMecklenburg Hosp. Auth., No. 3:16-cv-00311-RJC-DCK (W.D.N.C. Oct. 12, 2016).
279
Order, United States v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth., No. 3:16-cv-00311-RJC-DCK
(W.D.N.C. Mar. 30, 2017), ECF No. 46.
280
Id. at 16.
281
Final Judgment, United States v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth., No. 3:16-cv-00311-RJCDCK (W.D.N.C. Apr. 24, 2019), ECF No. 99.
282
See supra note 3.

52

REBUILDING PLATFORM ANTITRUST

[April 2022

Antitrust has recovered from grievous mistakes before; we trust it will do so
again.

